Our Evolving Work Using Cléirigh's Model

Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 27):

Our evolving work on these dependencies can be tracked through Martin et al. (2010), Hood (2011), Martin (2011), Martin, Zappavigna, Dwyer, and Cléirigh (2013) Martin and Zappavigna, 2018, Zappavigna and Martin (2018), and Hao and Hood (in press). From the perspective of SFL the most pertinent work on relations between modalities to compare with these studies is Painter et al. 2013 (on language and image in children’s picture books). Beyond these initiatives, multimodal discourse analysis research is best guided by Bateman et al. (2017).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, since it misrepresents the authorship of this first publication featuring Cléirigh's model of body language.  The actual citation is:

• Zappavigna, M., C. Cléirigh, P. Dwyer & J. R. Martin. 2010. The coupling of gesture and phonology. In M. Bednarek, & J.R. Martin (eds.), New discourse on language: Functional perspectives on multimodality, identity and affiliation. London: Continuum. 219–236.

The function of misrepresenting Martin as the first author is to position Martin as the origination of "our evolving work". (The paper was primarily written by Zappavigna, using Cléirigh's model; Dwyer and Martin were the tenured academics who were granted funding for the project.)

[2] As the clarifying critiques on this blog demonstrate, "our evolving work" involves serious misunderstandings of Cléirigh's model of body language, with these misunderstandings now rebranded as Martin's model of paralanguage.

[3] To be clear, Bateman favourably reviewed Martin's first major publication, English Text (1992). However, in doing so, he neglected to check the provenance of "Martin's" ideas or to consider whether the work was consistent with SFL theory or even with itself; evidence here.  For some of Bateman's misunderstandings of SFL theory, see here.

On This Paper Clarifying The Theoretical And Descriptive Challenges Posed In Martin (2011)

Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 27):

This of course makes research into the relation between language and paralanguage an interesting case study as far as research into intermodality in general is concerned, possibly helping to clarify some of the theoretical and descriptive challenges posed in Martin 2011.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, if, as the authors argue, paralanguage is an alternative expression plane of language, then the relation between language and paralanguage is not 'intermodal', since language and paralanguage are just two perspectives on the same semiotic mode.

[2] To be clear, given the wealth of theoretical confusions in this paper that have been identified here, any clarifications of any theoretical and descriptive challenges are purely accidental.

On the other hand, ignoring the fact that Martin (2011) begins by misunderstanding Saussure's sign (pp243-5), and the relation between Saussure's sign and linguistics (p245), and ignoring all the other theoretical misunderstandings that follow, the questions posed by Martin can be listed here so that the reader can assess which of them this paper has helped to clarify.

p245:

Based on this reading of Saussure one could ask of any multimodal analyst:

1. Do you conceive of the sign as an entity that realises a meaning located outside itself (in the material world or in the mind or elsewhere) or alternatively as a meaning construing act?
2. Where and how, if at all, do you explicitly model valeur (i.e. the system of differences among signs)?

pp246-7:

Based on this reading of Hjelmslev and Halliday, one could ask of any multimodal analyst:

1. For a given semiotic system, how many strata are you proposing, and on which stratum is your description located?
2. Are your strata related by metaredundancy (as patterns of patterns)?
3. Are there distinct systems of valeur on each of the strata you propose?
4. Is there any ontogenetic or phylogenetic evidence suggesting that any stratified system you propose evolved from an unstratified or a less stratified system?

p247:

Based on this reading of Halliday, one could ask of any multimodal analyst:

1. For a given stratum, how many ranks are you proposing, and at which rank is your description located?
2. Are there distinct systems of valeur on each of the ranks you propose?
3. Are your distinct systems of valeur related by constituency (as parts to wholes)?

p248:

Based on this reading of Halliday, one could ask of any multimodal analyst:

1. For a given semiotic system, how many metafunctions are you proposing?
2. Are there topologically distinct systems of valeur for each of the metafunctions you propose?
3. By what criteria are systems of valeur seen as relatively independent or interdependent of one another?

p249:

Based on this reading of Halliday one could ask of any multimodal analyst:

1. For a given semiotic system, how many kinds of structural realisation are you proposing?
2. Are the different types of realisation associated with different types of meaning?
3. When analogising from metafunctions in language to your semiotic system did you take kinds of meaning or types of structure as point of departure?

p250:

Based on this reading of paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations in SFL one could ask of any multimodal analyst:

1. Are your descriptions formalised as system/structure cycles, explicitly showing the relation of systemic choices to structural consequences?
2. How many system/structure cycles are you proposing and how are they related to one another (by strata, rank, metafunction or some other theoretical parameter)?

p252:

Based on this reading of system and text in SFL one could ask of any multimodal analyst:

1. Is the complementarity of realisation and instantiation addressed your description?
2. If so, how are you distinguishing axial realisation (the defining interdependency of system and structure) from instantiation (the logogenetic unfolding of realisational resources as text)?
3. As far as the contextual specification of your system is concerned, what genres/registers/text types do you propose?

p254:

In relation to Matthiessen’s proposed cline of integration one could ask the multimodal analyst:

1. Do you manage intermodality by proposing a single system of valeur, on a higher stratum or not, realised axially or inter-stratally by two or more modalities (realisational integration); or do you propose a coupling process weaving together meanings from different modalities in a single text (instantial integration)?

p255:

Based on these intermodal integration and complementarity issues one can ask the multimodal analyst:

1. Are the relations you recognise as obtaining between modalities in an intermodal text the same as those you find between units of a text in a monomodal one?
2. Do you recognise different kinds of intermodal relations depending on the kind of meaning involved (ideational/interpersonal/textual)?

p256:

Based on this discussion of affordances and commitment one could ask the multimodal analyst:

1. How do you model the amount of meaning committed and thereby the complementary contribution of different semiotic systems in an intermodal text?
2. How does the semantic weight of a given system’s contribution reflect its affordances?

p260:

In light of this reading of Cléirigh, one could ask:

1. Is the semiotic system you are working on a denotative semiotic system, with its own content form and expression form?
2. If not, does it involve parametric resources of the kind outlined by van Leeuwen (i.e. multiple, simultaneous, graded, binary systems)?
3. If so, could it be usefully factored into protosemiotic, denotative semiotic and epilinguistic systems?

p262:

In light of these concerns with identity and affiliation, one could ask:

1. How do you describe the allocation of the semiotic resources you are focusing on to repertoires of users?
2. How do these repertoires engender communities of such users?
3. Is there a distinctive role for denotative semiotic, protosemiotic and episemiotic systems in this process?

pp263-4:

In light of these concerns with the limits of semiosis, one could ask:

1. On what basis do you distinguish between the semiosis you are considering and its biological and/or physical environment?
2. To what extent do you feel that interdisciplinary research involving neurobiologists and/or physicists is necessary to give a full account of the discourse you are considering?
3. Are you deliberately treating aspects of biological and physical materiality as if they were semiosis?

Paralanguage As Language Expression

Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 26-7, 28):

In this model, the content form of face-to-face linguistic communication can be realised as phonology (of spoken language) or sign (including the sign languages of deaf communities and the ‘emblems’ of hearing ones), plus in both cases sonovergent and semovergent paralanguage; and for many languages we have a graphological system used for written communication. This leaves us with the terminological challenge of how best to name the sound quality and gestural resources we have been calling paralanguage in this paper (since they wouldn’t be para- anymore); we will not attempt to improve on our usage here. 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, content form is form, not function, and only refers to grammatical forms (clause, phrase/group, word, morpheme).  In terms of SFL theory, the authors here confuse 'form' with 'plane' (the level of symbolic abstraction that includes the strata of semantics and lexicogrammar).

[2] Here the authors reduce the expression systems of Sign languages to mere emblems, such as the thumbs-up sign and the middle finger salute.  To be clear, Sign languages are languages, and so, tri-stratal, and their gestural systems realise the lexicogrammar, just as phonological systems realise the lexicogrammar of spoken languages.  Emblems, on the other hand, are bi-stratal signs, and so their expressions only realise meaning directly, without the considerable semogenic power that a stratum of grammatical systems provides.  This is why emblems are types of epilinguistic body language in Cléirigh's model.

[3] To be clear, the expression systems of sonovergent paralanguage (Cléirigh's linguistic body language) only realise the linguistic content that prosodic phonology realises.  That is, it cannot realise the linguistic content that articulatory phonology realises, such as lexical items.  So the authors are seriously mistaken in presenting sonovergent paralanguage as an alternative to the entire phonological system.

[4] As previously explained, the claim that semovergent paralanguage (Cléirigh's epilinguistic body language) is an alternative to phonology and graphology is falsified by any clause that cannot be realised in semovergent paralanguage, such as the Leo Szilard quote:

A scientist's aim in a discussion with his colleagues is not to persuade, but to clarify.

To be clear, no grammatical structures can be realised in epilinguistic expressions (semovergent paralanguage) because epilinguistic semiosis is bi-stratal, not tri-stratal, and so expressions realise meaning directly, without the considerable semogenic power that a stratum of grammatical systems provides.  It is the absence of a grammar that the parlour game Charades exploits.

[5] To be clear, the authors began the paper by rebranding Cléirigh's model of body language as their model of paralanguage, and now, having satisfied themselves that their paralanguage is not paralanguage, the authors shy away from rebranding it with a more appropriate term, such as body language.

What Sonovergent Paralanguage Does

Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 25):

Sonovergent systems enact interpersonal meaning in tune with and compose textual meaning in sync with the prosodic phonology of language;

Blogger Comments:

The claims here are that:

• sonovergent paralanguage and prosodic phonology are 'in tune' in enacting interpersonal meaning, and
• sonovergent paralanguage and prosodic phonology are 'in sync' in composing textual meaning.

The problems here are as follows.

Firstly, prosodic phonology doesn't enact interpersonal meaning, it realises the wording that realises interpersonal meaning. By the same token, prosodic phonology doesn't compose textual meaning, it realises the wording that realises textual meaning.

Secondly, Cléirigh's linguistic body language (sonovergent paralanguage) is a stratified semiotic system, not merely an expression plane system, like prosodic phonology.

Thirdly, (stratified) sonovergent paralanguage doesn't enact interpersonal meaning; it enacts intersubjective relations as interpersonal meaning.  By the same token, (stratified) sonovergent paralanguage doesn't compose textual meaning; it organises ideational and interpersonal meaning as textual meaning.

The Notion That Emblematic Gestures Are Linguistic Alternatives To Phonology And Graphology

Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 25, 27, 29):

The relationship we are emphasising between emblems and alternative expression form systems is outlined in Fig. 44, using the words zero, one, two, three, four and five as examples. These words can be alternatively expressed in English through segmental phonology (e.g. /tuw/), graphological characters (e.g. ‘2’) or hand gestures (index and middle finger vertical).

 

An outline of the place of emblems in our overall system in presented in Fig. 45. Rather than treating them as a dimension of paralanguage, we have moved them over to language proper, as an alternative manifestation of its expression form.

 

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, Kendon's 'emblems', which he describes as 'quotable gestures', are conventionalised signs, such as 'thumbs-up', the 'V-sign', or the 'middle-finger salute'.  As signs, they are meaning/expression pairs, not tri-stratal language.

The authors, however, here present hand-shapes representing numbers as emblems and, on that basis, argue that the gestures involved are an alternative form of linguistic expression, along with phonology and graphology. An easy way to falsify this claim is to try to use emblematic gestures alone to express the following verse from Kenneth Grahame's The Wind In The Willows:

The clever men at Oxford
Know all that there is to be knowed.
But they none of them know one half as much,
As intelligent Mr. Toad!

The Argument That 'Emblems' Are Part Of Language

Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 24-5):

These gestures differ from the semovergent ones illustrated thus far in critical ways (cf. McNeill 2012: 7–10). For one thing they commit very specific meanings and can be readily recognised without accompanying co-text. As part of this specificity they can enact moves in exchange structure on their own – e.g. the statements and requests noted above, alongside greetings and leave-takings (hand waving), calls (beckoning gestures), agreement (nodding head), disagreement (shaking head), challenges (upright palm facing forward for ‘stop’) and so on. For another they are much more easily called to consciousness, as the first thing that comes to mind when someone mentions gesture. And in this regard they are often commented on as culturally specific (e.g. the difference between an Anglo supine hand beckoning gesture and its Filipino prone hand equivalent). In both respects emblems contrast with common-sense dismissals of the paralanguage (introduced in sections “Sonovergent paralanguage" and "Gesture converging with meaning (semovergent paralanguage)”) as idiosyncratic (although none of us has any trouble successfully interpreting another speaker’s sonovergent and semovergent systems). From the perspective of the sign language of the deaf, emblems most strongly resemble signs; they are expression form gestures explicitly encoding meaning. Similarly, from the perspective of character based writing systems (such as those of Chinese), emblems most strongly resemble characters (but gestured rather than scribed).

This indicates that emblems are better treated as part of language than as a dimension of paralanguage.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, here the authors outline their argument for classifying what Kendon terms 'emblems' as language rather than semovergent paralanguage (Cléirigh's epilinguistic body language).

[1] Incidentally, here the authors exemplify the use the word one as a constituent of a conjunctive Adjunct; see the preceding post on the vlogger gesturing the meaning 'one'.

[2] To be clear, in SFL theory, unknown to the authors, the conventionalisation of the meaning of specific gestures in a community corresponds to the move of the sign (content/expression pair) from the instance pole to the system pole of the cline of instantiation.  However, since this can occur in the development of semiotic systems in general — e.g. protolanguage, emoji, pictorial signage — it does not support the authors' argument that emblems are part of language.

[3] To be clear, gestures don't "commit" meanings, they realise them, since realisation is the relation between expression and content.  'Commitment', on the other hand, in Martin's own terms, is concerned with  instantiation, the relation between potential and instance, though, as previously explained here, the notion derives from Martin's misunderstanding of systemic delicacy.

[4] To be clear, here the authors have switched attention from tone groups to exchange structures in an attempt to fudge their argument.  In their own terms, these moves would constitute examples of interpersonal semovergent paralanguage, since the meaning of these gestures "resonates" or "converges" with the meanings of Martin's interpersonal discourse semantic system of NEGOTIATION.  Accordingly, this does not support the authors' argument that emblems are part of language.

[5] The authors' "argument" here is that because these gestures are regarded as prototypical gestures, they are therefore part of language.

[6] To be clear, on the one hand, some emblems are culturally-specific and some are not.  So culture specificity cannot be used as an argument about emblems as a type.  On the other hand, in any case, the culture-specificity of semiotic systems is not confined to language, as demonstrated, for example, by differences in the protolanguages of separated populations of the same species.

[7] To be clear, Halliday (1989: 30-1) distinguishes paralanguage from indexical features, the latter being those that are peculiar to the individual ("idiosyncratic").  So the authors' argument here is that  emblems are language because they are not indexical features.

[8] As this blog demonstrates, the authors do have trouble in interpreting both the meaning of the vlogger gestures and the type of body language involved.

[9] To be clear, the authors' argument here is that emblems are part of language because their expressions resemble the expressions of language (Sign and Chinese), and that, in the case of one of these, at least, the expressions "explicitly encode" meaning.

On the one hand, if this is true, it applies to all languages, not just Sign and Chinese.  On the other hand, the reason it is not true is that the expressions of Sign and Chinese, encode the wording that encodes meaning, whereas the expressions of emblems only encode meaning.  That is, Sign and Chinese, being languages, are tri-stratal, whereas emblems, not being language, are bi-stratal.  Once again, the authors' argument does not support their claim that emblems are part of language.

[10] As the above clarifications demonstrate, not one of the arguments offered by the authors supports their hypothesis that emblems are part of language.

Emblems

Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 23-4):

Emblems

It remains to introduce our treatment of what Kendon (Kendon 2004) refers to as emblems, drawing on Ekman and Friesen (1969). Included here are gestures such as thumbs up or thumbs down (as praise or censure), index finger touching lips (for ‘quiet please’), hand cupped over ear (for ‘I can’t hear’), middle finger vertical (for ‘get fucked’) and so on. Our vlogger uses one of these gestures to introduce the first of her  explanations as to why her hair is darker than usual – raising her index finger as an emblem for the numeral ‘1’ (Fig. 43). 

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, in terms of SFL theory, the word one here functions like firstly, as a conjunctive Adjunct, realising a textually cohesive temporal conjunctive relation internal to the discourse.  On this basis, the index finger gesture, on Cléirigh's original model, is an instance of textual epilinguistic body language, an expression realising the same meaning as the word.

On Martin's (1992) model, cohesive conjunction is misunderstood as a logical discourse semantic system, now rebranded as CONNEXION.  On this basis, the authors here missed an opportunity to present an instance of logical semovergent paralanguage.  (It will later be seen that the authors regard emblems — what Kendon glosses as 'quotable gestures' — as expressions of language, rather than stratified paralanguage).

Multiple Dimensions Of Paralanguage Converging On The Same Tone Group

Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 20, 16):

Although presented as a simple taxonomy, all five subtypes of paralanguage can combine with one another in support of a single tone group (Fig. 38). 

Several examples of multiple dimensions of paralanguage converging on the same tone group were in fact presented above (for example, the combination of motion towards the future and pointing deixis in Example (19) of section “representation (ideational semovergent paralanguage)”). 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is Cléirigh's original model misleadingly presented as if it is a claim of the authors.

[2] As previous posts have demonstrated, this is not true of epilinguistic body language ("semovergent paralanguage"), which can be instantiated with or without language.  The authors have tried to mislead the reader, in this regard, by simply presenting all the text accompanying body language with tone group boundaries (//).

[3] For the misunderstandings and misrepresentations involved in the authors' analysis of this instance, see the two previous posts:

• Gestural Motion "Supporting" Direction In Space Or Time
• Introducing And Tracking Entities Through Finger Pointing

Introducing And Tracking Entities Through Finger Pointing

Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 19, 21-2):

As far as pointing deixis is concerned we can return to the examples contrasting past and future in sections “Sonovergent paralanguage" and "Representation (ideational semovergent paralanguage)” above. Alongside motioning to the past the vlogger’s hand points there. And alongside motioning to the future both the vlogger’s index fingers point there (Figs. 33 and 34).

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the authors' claim (ibid.) is that:

From a textual perspective we need to take into account how spoken language introduces entities and keeps track of them once there (IDENTIFICATION) …

Clearly, because 'past' and 'future' are temporal locations, they are not entities, and pointing gestures do not introduce them as entities, nor keep track of them through the discourse.  This is another instance of the authors misrepresenting the data to fit their theory.

Note also that the unit of IDENTIFICATION in Martin (1992) and Martin & Rose (2007) is participant, not entity.

[2] Once again the authors present a tone group that is not analysed for tone or for foot boundaries, and wrongly analysed for tonicity (the tonic falls on next, not time).

Textual Semovergent Paralanguage

Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 19, 30):

Information flow (textual semovergent paralanguage)

From a textual perspective²² we need to take into account how spoken language introduces entities and keeps track of them once there (IDENTIFICATION) and how it composes waves of information in tone groups, clauses and beyond (PERIODICITY).  Semovergent paralanguage potentially supports these resources with pointing gestures and whole body movement and position.

²² Martinec (1998) interprets textual meaning as realised through cohesion, following Halliday and Hasan (1976); here we follow Martin (1992) who reinterprets cohesion as discourse semantics, organised metafunctionally in Martin and Rose (2007) as ideational resources (IDEATION, CONNEXION), interpersonal resources (NEGOTIATION, APPRAISAL) and textual resources (IDENTIFICATION, PERIODICITY).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, despite this claim, it will be seen that the authors provide no instances of semovergent paralanguage in this paper that either introduce entities or keep track of them.

Moreover, IDENTIFICATION is Martin's rebranding of Halliday and Hasan's (1976) grammatical cohesive systems of REFERENCE and ELLIPSIS-&-SUBSTITUTION, misunderstood, confused with ideational denotation and the interpersonal DEIXIS of nominal group structure, and relocated to discourse semantics; evidence here.

[2] To be clear, on the one hand, this confuses content (information) with expression (tone group), following Martin (1992: 384).  On the other hand, on Cléirigh's original model, any aspect of body language that highlights the focus of New information, or delineates a unit of information, functions as linguistic body language ("sonovergent" paralanguage), not epilinguistic body language ("semovergent" paralanguage).

[3] To be clear, PERIODICITY is Martin and Rose's (2003, 2007) reinterpretation of what Martin (1992: 393) models as interstratal interaction patterns as a textual systems of Martin's discourse semantic stratum.  However, Martin's model misrepresents writing pedagogy as linguistic theory, such that:

• introductory paragraph is rebranded as macro-Theme,
• topic sentence is rebranded as hyper-Theme,
• paragraph summary is rebranded as hyper-New, and
• text summary is rebranded as macro-New.

It will be seen that, unsurprisingly, the authors provide no instances of semovergent paralanguage in this paper that 'compose waves of information', let alone gestural realisations of introductory paragraphs, topic sentences, paragraph summaries or text summaries.

[4] To be clear, here Martin and his former student follow Martin (1992) in rebranding misunderstandings Halliday & Hasan's (1976) non-structural textual systems of lexicogrammar as structural discourse semantic systems across three metafunctions.

[5] To be clear, IDEATION is Martin's rebranding of Halliday and Hasan's (1976) textual system of LEXICAL COHESION, misunderstood, confused with logical relations between experiential elements of nominal group structure, also misunderstood, and relocated to discourse semantics as an experiential system; evidence here.

[6] To be clear, CONNEXION does not feature in Martin and Rose (2007), or in Martin (1992). The term 'CONNEXION' is a rebranding of Martin's CONJUNCTION by Martin's former student, Hao. CONJUNCTION is Martin's misunderstanding of Halliday and Hasan's (1976) textual lexicogrammatical system of cohesive conjunction as a logical system at the level of discourse semantics.  Moreover, it confuses non-structural textual relations with structural logical relations, and misunderstands and misapplies the expansion relations involved; evidence here.

That is to say, CONJUNCTION was the only one of Halliday and Hasan's cohesive systems that Martin neglected to rebrand as his own system, and this oversight was finally addressed by his former student.

[7] To be clear, NEGOTIATION is Martin's (1992) rebranding of Halliday's SPEECH FUNCTION.

The Need For A Metalanguage For Facial Expression

Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 18, 29):

Further work on this interpersonal aural dimension of paralanguage, drawing on van Leeuwen 1999, is beyond the scope of our current research.²¹ 

²¹ We also need to acknowledge that a metalanguage for facial expression, in some sense comparable in specificity to SFL work on attitude in the APPRAISAL framework, remains to be developed.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, in Cléirigh's original model of body language, facial expressions can function:

1. protolinguistically (e.g. realising emotions), 
2. linguistically (e.g. realising features of KEY), or 
3. epilinguistically (e.g. realising 'uncertain' MODALITY). 

The authors (p29), however, have dismissed the notion of protolinguistic body language, on a misunderstanding, as previously demonstrated here, and reinterpreted it as either non-semiotic behaviour ("somasis") — which they nevertheless interpret as if semiotic — or as interpersonal epilinguistic body language ("semovergent" paralanguage).

Mistaking Language (Intonation) For Paralanguage (Voice Quality)

Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 18):

Voice quality was noted in section “Sonovergent paralanguage” above in relation to the sing/song pitch (high then low) movement the vlogger uses in her last four tone groups to close down her hair dye narrative. From the perspective of APPRAISAL the sound quality resonates with her resignation. Further work on this interpersonal aural dimension of paralanguage, drawing on van Leeuwen 1999, is beyond the scope of our current research.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Here the authors mistake prosodic features (the TONE sequence 3^13^3^1–) for a paralinguistic feature ("sing/song" voice quality).  Halliday (1985: 30-1) explains the difference as follows:

 

Moreover, if what the authors regard as "sing/song" pitch:

//3 hopefully / next ↑time I will 
//1 get my / ↓hair colour / back 
//3 um / but for / ↑now 
//3 this will / ↓do //

is compared with an accurate phonological analysis:

//3 hopefully / next time I will
//13 get my / hair colour / back
//3 um /but for / now 
//1- this will / do //

It can be seen that:

• the first ↑ corresponds to the low-rising pitch of tone 3,
• the first ↓ corresponds to the falling pitch of tone 1,
• the second ↑ corresponds to the low-rising pitch of tone 3, and
• the second ↓ corresponds to the narrow falling pitch of tone 1–

[2] To be clear, it is only the final TONE selection, tone 1–, that coincides with the APPRAISAL that the authors interpret as 'resignation' (this will do).  In SFL theory, the selection of tone 1– with declarative MOOD realises the KEY features 'mild or expected'.  Halliday (1970: 31):

Meaning of secondary tones In some cases the difference between a pair, or set, of secondary tones is mainly a matter of 'key', the degree of forcefulness or emotional intensity of the utterance. …

1. (medium), neutral; 1+ (wide), strong or unexpected; 1– (narrow), mild or expected.

On this basis, what the authors regard as voice quality "resonating" with 'resignation' is, in the authors' terms — though unknown to them — actually an instance of a secondary tone realising a feature of GRADUATION.

Paralanguage "Converging With" GRADUATION: FORCE

Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 17, 19):

The most striking example of intensification in the hair colour episode occurs when the vlogger uses whole body movement to enact her reaction to how dark her hair is. She throws her head back and leans back as her arms move rise up – literally overwhelmed with emotion (Fig. 28).

Blogger Comment:

[1] To be clear, it is not that the whole body expresses the same meaning in this instance, but that the authors have not analysed the different meanings being made by the various gestures and postures, including the shift of gaze.

[2] To be clear, the intensification in this instance is of the Quality dark, which is ideational in function, and quite distinct from the speaker's hatred of the Quality, which is construed by the following clause.  That is, the intensification is a feature of the assessed, not of the assessing (e.g. I really hate it).   This is demonstrated by the fact that the arm gesture beats on the tonic so, the intensifier of dark.

In terms of Cléirigh's original model, the beating of the gesture on the tonic is linguistic body language ("sonovergent" paralanguage), highlighting so as the focus of contrastively New information, whereas any aspects of the body language expressing conscious states are instantiations of paralinguistic body language.  That is, contrary to the authors' claim, no aspects of this instance of body language can be identified as epilinguistic ("semovergent").

[3] The claim that this gestural configuration expresses 'being overwhelmed by the emotion of hate' — literally or figuratively — requires considerable justification, none of which is given.

[4] To be clear, Figure 28 displays an (incomplete and) incorrect phonological analysis — the tonic  actually falls on so, not dark, the initial foot is omitted, and the pronoun I begins the following tone group (after a silent Ictus):

//1+ and it's / so dark //

An Epilinguistic Projection Of Protolinguistic Body Language

Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 16, 18):

A good example of a combined face and body commitment of affect in the vlog we are drawing our examples from comes as the vlogger is complaining about being hassled for her parking spot before she is ready to leave. The relevant tone groups are presented below, and we will return to this example in our discussion of mime in section “Emblems” below. At this point we are simply interested in the way the vlogger’s facial expression and arm position are used to express the hassler’s exasperation (Fig. 26).

// some guy was sitting there
// and there was cars behind him
// and he was like
// [mimics man’s expression]
// [mimics man’s gesture] like
// waving me out //

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL theory, the relation between expression ('face and body') and content ('affect') is realisation, not commitment.  'Commitment' is Martin's misunderstanding of instantiation, as previously explained here.

[2] To be clear, the presentation of the data of tone groups is misleading.  These tone groups are not analysed for tone or tonicity, and there are no foot boundaries indicating the speech rhythm.  That is, the term 'tone group' is entirely redundant here, since the same point can be made by a simple transcript:

some guy was sitting there and there was cars behind him and he was like [mimics man’s expression] [mimics man’s gesture] like waving me out

The reason the term 'tone group' is used here is to give false support to the proposal (p3):

We will in fact suggest that SFL’s tone group, analysed for rhythm and tone, provides an essential unit of analysis for work on paralanguage as far as questions of synchronicity across modalities are concerned.

[3] To be clear, this expression of exasperation realises ATTITUDE, not because it expresses an emotion, but because the exasperation enacts an assessment (of the speaker by a motorist).

In terms of Cléirigh's original model, contrary to the authors' interpretation, the motorist's ATTITUDE is realised in protolinguistic body language, not epilinguistic body language ("semovergent" paralanguage).  The gesture is a manifestation of a conscious state that functions socio-semiotically.

The vlogger's mime of the motorist's body language, on the other hand, is an instance of epilinguistic body language in which she projects the motorist's protolinguistic body language that assesses her.

Abducing Defeasible Conjunctive Relations

Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 13):

As with imagic sequences in film, animations, graphic novels, comics, cartoons and picture books, the gesture sequence does not make explicit the conjunctive relations between figures. These have to be abduced (Bateman 2007) from the sequence and concurring language. In the case of this sequence conjunctive relations of time and cause are not made explicit linguistically either; only the additive linker and, is used. A defeasible reading of the sequence is offered below.

// and so the dermatologist um took like this needle
(temporal sequential)
// and under each like bump
(temporal overlapping)
// and injected this like steroid
(causal)
// and like it all bubbled up //

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here the authors are concerned with the expansion relations between the meaning realised by gestures, not with identifying any gestures that might realise such expansion relations.

[2] The problem with abductive reasoning is that it is formally equivalent to a logical fallacy:

Abductive reasoning allows inferring a as an explanation of b. As a result of this inference, abduction allows the precondition a to be abduced from the consequence b. Deductive reasoning and abductive reasoning thus differ in the direction in which a rule like "a entails b" is used for inference. As such, abduction is formally equivalent to the logical fallacy of affirming the consequent (or Post hoc ergo propter hoc) because of multiple possible explanations for b.

[3] To be clear, here the authors are abducing the expansion relations between figures in a sequence of language and claiming that such relations also apply to the meanings realised in body language, despite the fact that there are no gestural realisations of any of these relations, let alone gestural distinctions between temporal and causal relations.

The reason why it is possible to interpret implicit expansion relations in language is that there are linguistic agnates that can be used to demonstrate that the same meaning is being construed.  In the case of and, Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 487) have already done the work for us:

However, in the case of body language, the authors have provided no gestural agnates that can be used to demonstrate that the same meaning is being construed by the complete absence of such gestures.

[4] To be clear, 'defeasible' means open in principle to revision, valid objection, forfeiture, or annulment, and this is certainly the case here, as demonstrated below.  Moreover:

In logic, defeasible reasoning is a kind of reasoning that is rationally compelling, though not deductively valid. … Defeasible reasoning is a particular kind of non-demonstrative reasoning, where the reasoning does not produce a full, complete, or final demonstration of a claim, i.e., where fallibility and corrigibility of a conclusion are acknowledged. In other words, defeasible reasoning produces a contingent statement or claim.

[5] Here the authors confuse phonology (tone groups) with semantics (sequences of figures).  This is a sequence of three figures:

1. and so the dermatologist um took like this needle
2. and under each like bump (and) injected this like steroid
3. and like it all bubbled up

The expansion relation between 1 and 2 and between 2 and 3 is temporal: different: later ('and then').  Abducing the second relation as causal: reason ('and so') is feasible, though more defeasible.

Note that the authors' 'temporal overlapping' analysis mistakenly relates the circumstance of the figure to the Nucleus of the same figure.

Martin's Notion Of Commitment

Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 12-3):

In terms of commitment (i.e. the amount of meaning specified across semiotic modes; Martin 2010, Painter et al. 2013), the dermatologist and steroid are committed in the language but not the paralanguage; but the needle is more delicately committed in the paralanguage as a tiny pointed entity and then as a syringe. 

And the paralinguistic commitment of the bump in fact takes place two tone groups after it is committed verbally.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Martin's notion of 'commitment' is invalidated by the fact that it is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the system network, namely: that a speaker can choose the degree of delicacy to be instantiated during logogenesis.  As Martin (2011: 255-6) explains:

Instantiation also opens up theoretical and descriptive space for considering commitment (Martin 2008, 2010), which refers to the amount of meaning instantiated as the text unfolds.  This depends on the number of optional systems taken up and the degree of delicacy pursued in those that are, so that the more systems entered, and the more options chosen, the greater the semantic weight of a text (Hood 2008).

To be clear, a system network is not a type of flowchart, such that instantiation involves a movement through more and more delicate systems.  A system network is a network of relations.  In the case of lexicogrammar, the system specifies how all the features are related to each other, such that the instantiation of each lexical item in a text is the instantiation of all the features that specify it, from the most general all the way to the most delicate.

In short, Martin misconstrues what the linguist can do — decide on the degree of delicacy "pursued" in analysing a text — as what a speaker can do; but see also [3] below.

[2] Translating into SFL theory, the claim here is that the meanings 'dermatologist' and 'steroid' are instantiated in the language but not in paralanguage.  However, this is manifestly untrue.  As previously explained, the body of the speaker herself represented the dermatologist in two figures ('taking the needle' and 'injecting the steroid').

The instantiation of the meaning 'steroid' is more subtle.  Because, as Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 156) point out, a Process requires a Medium for its actualisation, the gesture representing the 'injecting' Process implicates a Medium, and so the meaning 'fluid' is at least implicated in the gesture, even if the meaning 'steroid' is not precisely specified.  (Try gesturing the meaning 'steroid'.)

To be clear, the authors' false claim derives from two procedural errors:

• assuming that handshape is the only bodily expression of ideational meaning here, and
• analysing at the level of element ("entity") instead of figure (while claiming the latter).

[3] As explained in [1], Martin's notion of "more delicate commitment" is nonsensical, based as it is on his misunderstanding of what system networks represent.

However, here it can also be seen that Martin confuses 'delicacy' as a scale of decreasing generality in system networks with 'delicacy' as a scale of decreasing generality in construing experience as meaning, as in 'needle' vs 'tiny pointed entity'.   It can also be seen that, even in these terms, the authors have the relation backwards, since 'tiny pointed entity' is a more general construal than 'needle', not more delicate, since, as a class, it includes a broader range of potential members.

[4] To be clear, the word 'syringe' is not instantiated in the data.  It appears only in the authors' gloss of the body language accompanying the wording and injected this like steroid.

[5] As explained in the previous post, the reason why this gesture is made with the final figure, and not the second, is that it realises the nucleus of the final figure, it all bubbled up, rather than the meaning of the word bump in the second figure.  The authors' confusion again arises from analysing isolated elements instead of their functions in figures.

Misinterpreting The Data

Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 12-3):

By way of illustration we now move to the next section in the vlog, which concerns a visit to the vlogger’s dermatologist (for treatment for granuloma). The sequence of figures we are interested in unfolds verbally in tone groups as follows (for the complete anecdote see Appendix B):

// and so the dermatologist um took like this needle
// and under each like bump
// and injected this like steroid
// and like it all bubbled up //

From the perspective of language, this sequence makes explicit four entities (dermatologist, needle, bump, steroid). The paralanguage uses handshape to concur with two of these (needle and bump) (Fig. 16). The ‘needle’ is first rendered as a tiny pointed entity the vlogger holds between thumb and index finger, and then with the hand shape used for holding a syringe. The ‘bump’ is not actually visualised until the fourth tone group, where it renders the shape of the steroid bubbling up. As we can see, the meanings construed in language and paralanguage can either correspond or complement one another. 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading. To be clear, 'sequence' and 'figure' are types of phenomenon in the ideational semantics of Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 48); they do not feature in the discourse semantic system of IDEATION (Martin 1992).

[2] Having introduced the data in terms of two higher orders of phenomenon in Halliday & Matthiessen's ideational semantics, sequence and figure, the authors actually analyse the data in terms of the lowest order, element.

[3] To be clear, the claim here is that the meaning realised by the handshape "concurs" with the meaning realised by the wordings needle and bump.  However, neither of the two handshapes realises needle, since neither handshape depicts a sharply pointed metal stick; see further in [5] below.  

[4] There are several inconsistencies in Figure 16.

• Firstly, the paralanguage gloss confuses content (holding needle, holding syringe) with expression (cupped hands).

• Secondly, the glosses correlate elements ("entities") of language (needle, bump) with figures for paralanguage (holding needle, holding syringe).

• Thirdly, the glosses of the paralanguage content are not motivated by the data.  On the basis of both the gestures and the accompanying language, the glosses are more consistently construed along the lines of taking needle and injecting steroid; moreover, the word syringe was not used by the speaker.

[5] To be clear, this handshape does not depict a needle.  Instead, the handshape realises the same meaning as the wording took this needle in the figure so the dermatologist took this needle; that is, it realises the nucleus of the figure, Process and Medium.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 156):

Semantically, the nucleus construes the centre of gravity of a figure, the focal point around which the system of figures is organised. When we describe the Medium as "actualising" the Process, we are really saying that the unfolding is constituted by the fusion of the two together — there can be no Process without an element through which this process is translated from the virtual to the actual.

Note that the Agent of this figure, the dermatologist, is represented by the speaker herself.

[6] To be clear, this handshape does not depict a needle.  Instead, the handshape realises the same meaning as the wording injected steroid in the figure and under each bump injected this steroid; that is, this again realises the the nucleus of the figure.  Again the (ellipsed) Agent of this figure, the dermatologist, is represented by the speaker herself.

[7] In this instance the handshape does depict one of the bumps (granulomas).  However, the reason why this gesture is made with the final figure, and not the second, is that it realises the nucleus of the final figure, and like it all bubbled up, rather than the meaning of the word bump in the second figure.

Note that, on the authors' interpretation, the meaning of the second tone group does not "concur" with the meaning of the co-occurring body language.

[8] To be clear, the handshape depicts the shape of a granuloma as it rises after the injection of the steroid.

[9] To be clear, the superficiality of this claim can be made more explicit by considering what it rules out:  

• the meanings construed in language and paralanguage neither correspond nor complement one another.

∞

These issues will be revisited in the following two posts.

Ideational Semovergent Paralanguage

Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 11, 12):

Representation (ideational semovergent paralanguage) 

From an ideational perspective we need to take into account how spoken language combines entities, occurrences, qualities and spatiotemporal circumscriptions as figures (IDEATION), and how these figures are connected to one another (CONNEXION).

Semovergent paralanguage supports these resources with hand shapes, which potentially concur with entities, and hand/arm motion, which potentially concurs with occurrences; the hand/arm motion is optionally directed, potentially concurring with spatiotemporal direction (to/from there in space, to/from then in time). We say “potentially concurring” because ideational paralanguage can be used on its own, without accompany spoken language; see the discussion of mime in section "Multidimensionality (multiplying meaning)" below.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, 'semovergent paralanguage' is the authors' rebranding of Cléirigh's epilinguistic body language.

[2] As previously explained, and argued here, Martin's ideational discourse semantic systems of IDEATION and CONNEXION are neither ideational nor semantic, since they are misunderstood rebrandings of Halliday & Hasan's (1976) lexical cohesion and cohesive conjunction, which are lexicogrammatical systems of the textual metafunction.

[3] To be clear, this is a matter of language, regardless of whether it is spoken, written or signed.

[4] To be clear, in the discourse semantic system of IDEATION (Martin 1992: 314-9; Martin & Rose 2007: 96), 'entity' refers only to a subtype of Range.

[5] To be clear, in the discourse semantic system of IDEATION (Martin 1992: 314-9; Martin & Rose 2007: 90ff), these are termed 'processes', not 'occurrences'.

[6] This is presumably a typo for 'spatiotemporal circumstances', merely one of nine general types of circumstance.

[7] This is very misleading.  To be clear, 'figure' is a type of phenomenon in the (genuinely) ideational semantics of Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 48).  It does not feature in the discourse semantic system of IDEATION in Martin (1992).  Martin & Rose (2007: 74) introduce the term 'figure' without acknowledging their source and without integrating it into their model of IDEATION.  Moreover, because Martin's IDEATION is a rebranded misunderstanding of lexical cohesion, it cannot be integrated into their model in a theoretically consistent way.

[8] The word 'support' here is potentially misleading, since epilinguistic body language makes meaning in its own right.

[9] Here the authors propose 1-to-1 relationships between the expression of body language and the content of language — instead of the content of body language.  This confusion leads the authors to the false conclusion at the end of the paper that body language is just another expression mode of language itself.

Even so, the validity of proposed 1-to-1 relationships will be examined in upcoming posts.

[10] Here the authors mislead the reader by presenting a claim of Cléirigh's epilinguistic body language as if it is their own.

[11] See the upcoming critique of the authors' discussion of 'mime'.

Textual Paralanguage "Syncing" With Identification And Periodicity

Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 11, 29):

and textual body language is ‘deictic’, syncing with IDENTIFICATION and PERIODICITY ⁱ⁸ systems. 

ⁱ⁸ Semovergent synchronicity is concerned with the syncing of paralanguage with periodic structure composed above and beyond prosodic phonology.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is the authors' rebranding of the textual dimension of Cléirigh's epilinguistic body language, a type can be deployed with or without spoken language:

	semantics	kinetic expression
textual	eg reference: exophoric vs endophoric; personal vs demonstrative	ø pointing hands, eyes, head exophoric ø pointing to phenomena and metaphenomena in the field of perception endophoric ø pointing to regions of (metaphenomenal) gesturing space as text

[2] To be clear, the meaning of 'deictic' here is in the sense of reference; that is, interpersonal distinctions being used textually. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 624):

… it seems quite likely that reference first evolved as a means of linking ‘outwards’ to some entity in the environment. So, for example, the concept of ‘he’ probably originated as ‘that man over there’ – a reference to a person in the field of perception shared by speaker and listener. In other words we may postulate an imaginary stage in the evolution of language when the basic referential category of PERSON was deictic in the strict sense, ‘to be interpreted by reference to the situation here and now’.

[3] The claim here is that the semogenesis of textual epilinguistic body language — such as pointing gestures that realise exophoric reference — is 'in sync' with the semogenesis of Martin's textual linguistic systems IDENTIFICATION and PERIODICITY. In the case of IDENTIFICATION, presented below is the system (Martin & Rose 2007: 183) that the authors claim that the meanings of simple pointing gestures 'sync with':

[4] To be clear, Martin's (1992) discourse semantic system of IDENTIFICATION is his rebranding of Halliday & Hasan's (1976) grammatical reference, a system of the textual metafunction which Martin confuses with ideational denotation and the interpersonal deixis of the nominal group (evidence here). Moreover, as will be seen, the authors do not provide any genuine examples in support of their contention.

[5] To be clear, the discourse semantic system of PERIODICITY (Martin & Rose 2007: 187-218) is a reworking of what Martin (1992: 393) regarded as interaction patterns between strata. The notions of method of development and point were taken from Fries (1981), and the term hyper-Theme from Daneš (1974), but misunderstood. Martin's model confuses writing pedagogy with linguistic theory (evidence here), and rebrands the pedagogical terms as follows:

• macro-Theme is Martin's rebranding of introductory paragraph 
• hyper-Theme is Martin's rebranding of topic sentence, 
• hyper-New is Martin's rebranding of paragraph summary 
• macro-New is Martin's rebranding of text summary 

The authors' absurd claim, then, is that gestures accompanying speech are synchronised with categories to guide effective writing. Unsurprisingly, the authors do not provide any genuine examples in support of their contention, as will be seen.