On This Paper Clarifying The Theoretical And Descriptive Challenges Posed In Martin (2011)

Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 27):

This of course makes research into the relation between language and paralanguage an interesting case study as far as research into intermodality in general is concerned, possibly helping to clarify some of the theoretical and descriptive challenges posed in Martin 2011.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, if, as the authors argue, paralanguage is an alternative expression plane of language, then the relation between language and paralanguage is not 'intermodal', since language and paralanguage are just two perspectives on the same semiotic mode.

[2] To be clear, given the wealth of theoretical confusions in this paper that have been identified here, any clarifications of any theoretical and descriptive challenges are purely accidental.

On the other hand, ignoring the fact that Martin (2011) begins by misunderstanding Saussure's sign (pp243-5), and the relation between Saussure's sign and linguistics (p245), and ignoring all the other theoretical misunderstandings that follow, the questions posed by Martin can be listed here so that the reader can assess which of them this paper has helped to clarify.

p245:

Based on this reading of Saussure one could ask of any multimodal analyst:

1. Do you conceive of the sign as an entity that realises a meaning located outside itself (in the material world or in the mind or elsewhere) or alternatively as a meaning construing act?
2. Where and how, if at all, do you explicitly model valeur (i.e. the system of differences among signs)?

pp246-7:

Based on this reading of Hjelmslev and Halliday, one could ask of any multimodal analyst:

1. For a given semiotic system, how many strata are you proposing, and on which stratum is your description located?
2. Are your strata related by metaredundancy (as patterns of patterns)?
3. Are there distinct systems of valeur on each of the strata you propose?
4. Is there any ontogenetic or phylogenetic evidence suggesting that any stratified system you propose evolved from an unstratified or a less stratified system?

p247:

Based on this reading of Halliday, one could ask of any multimodal analyst:

1. For a given stratum, how many ranks are you proposing, and at which rank is your description located?
2. Are there distinct systems of valeur on each of the ranks you propose?
3. Are your distinct systems of valeur related by constituency (as parts to wholes)?

p248:

Based on this reading of Halliday, one could ask of any multimodal analyst:

1. For a given semiotic system, how many metafunctions are you proposing?
2. Are there topologically distinct systems of valeur for each of the metafunctions you propose?
3. By what criteria are systems of valeur seen as relatively independent or interdependent of one another?

p249:

Based on this reading of Halliday one could ask of any multimodal analyst:

1. For a given semiotic system, how many kinds of structural realisation are you proposing?
2. Are the different types of realisation associated with different types of meaning?
3. When analogising from metafunctions in language to your semiotic system did you take kinds of meaning or types of structure as point of departure?

p250:

Based on this reading of paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations in SFL one could ask of any multimodal analyst:

1. Are your descriptions formalised as system/structure cycles, explicitly showing the relation of systemic choices to structural consequences?
2. How many system/structure cycles are you proposing and how are they related to one another (by strata, rank, metafunction or some other theoretical parameter)?

p252:

Based on this reading of system and text in SFL one could ask of any multimodal analyst:

1. Is the complementarity of realisation and instantiation addressed your description?
2. If so, how are you distinguishing axial realisation (the defining interdependency of system and structure) from instantiation (the logogenetic unfolding of realisational resources as text)?
3. As far as the contextual specification of your system is concerned, what genres/registers/text types do you propose?

p254:

In relation to Matthiessen’s proposed cline of integration one could ask the multimodal analyst:

1. Do you manage intermodality by proposing a single system of valeur, on a higher stratum or not, realised axially or inter-stratally by two or more modalities (realisational integration); or do you propose a coupling process weaving together meanings from different modalities in a single text (instantial integration)?

p255:

Based on these intermodal integration and complementarity issues one can ask the multimodal analyst:

1. Are the relations you recognise as obtaining between modalities in an intermodal text the same as those you find between units of a text in a monomodal one?
2. Do you recognise different kinds of intermodal relations depending on the kind of meaning involved (ideational/interpersonal/textual)?

p256:

Based on this discussion of affordances and commitment one could ask the multimodal analyst:

1. How do you model the amount of meaning committed and thereby the complementary contribution of different semiotic systems in an intermodal text?
2. How does the semantic weight of a given system’s contribution reflect its affordances?

p260:

In light of this reading of Cléirigh, one could ask:

1. Is the semiotic system you are working on a denotative semiotic system, with its own content form and expression form?
2. If not, does it involve parametric resources of the kind outlined by van Leeuwen (i.e. multiple, simultaneous, graded, binary systems)?
3. If so, could it be usefully factored into protosemiotic, denotative semiotic and epilinguistic systems?

p262:

In light of these concerns with identity and affiliation, one could ask:

1. How do you describe the allocation of the semiotic resources you are focusing on to repertoires of users?
2. How do these repertoires engender communities of such users?
3. Is there a distinctive role for denotative semiotic, protosemiotic and episemiotic systems in this process?

pp263-4:

In light of these concerns with the limits of semiosis, one could ask:

1. On what basis do you distinguish between the semiosis you are considering and its biological and/or physical environment?
2. To what extent do you feel that interdisciplinary research involving neurobiologists and/or physicists is necessary to give a full account of the discourse you are considering?
3. Are you deliberately treating aspects of biological and physical materiality as if they were semiosis?

The Argument That All Body Language Is Paralanguage

Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 26):

Compared to other modalities of communication, paralanguage has a distinctive relation to language in that it is coordinated with prosodic phonology. This is obviously true, by definition, for sonovergent paralanguage. But semovergent paralanguage is also coordinated with TONALITY, TONICITY RHYTHM and TONE, since gestures, facial expression, bodily stance and sounds unfold in measures of time converging with units of rhythm and intonation. Even brief episodes of mime follow this principle, filling in for ‘missing’ tonic segments or tone groups as a whole. Alongside this expression form of temporal dependency, paralanguage is dependent on the content form of language because of its inherent generality. Semovergent paralanguage typically commits meaning far less specifically than spoken language can; instantiations are by and large interpretable with respect to what is said. With respect to these two dependencies, the prefix para- (understood as ‘beside’) is appropriate.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously noted, the authors have not demonstrated this to be the case; they have merely presented the language accompanying gestures with markers of tone group boundaries in order to fudge their argument.  This is the logical fallacy known as begging the question (petitio principii).

[2] Here the authors claim that the use of mime in the absence of language demonstrates that mime is timed with units of rhythm and intonation.  By the same logic, it could be argued that mime is timed with the units of grammar or semantics that are also absent.

[3] Here the authors interpret the fact that epilinguistic body language (semovergent paralanguage) can occur with or without prosodic phonology as body language being dependent on prosodic phonology.

[4] Here the authors claim that epilinguistic body language (semovergent paralanguage) is dependent on the content form of language.  Apparently unknown to the authors, the content form of language refers to the rank units of the grammar: clause, phrase/group, word and morpheme.  On the one hand, the authors have not demonstrated any relations between epilinguistic body language and grammatical forms, and on the other hand, epilinguistic body language is bi-stratal: content / expression only — it has no grammatical stratum.

[5] Here the authors confuse descriptive delicacy — which Martin's 'commitment' confuses with systemic delicacy — with stratification.  Because epilinguistic body language, like all epilanguage, is only bi-stratal, it lacks the grammatical resources for realising meaning.  That is, its (linguistic) meaning can only be realised directly in expression systems, and this greatly reduces its semogenic potential in comparison to language.

[6] To be clear, the authors argue that body language is 'para-' on the basis that it is 'hypo-' (dependent); cf. paratactic vs hypotactic.  Moreover, neither of the stated dependencies survives close scrutiny, as [4] and [5] above demonstrate.  That is to say, the authors' argument does not support their claim that 'paralanguage' is an appropriate characterisation of these two body language systems.

The Argument That 'Emblems' Are Part Of Language

Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 24-5):

These gestures differ from the semovergent ones illustrated thus far in critical ways (cf. McNeill 2012: 7–10). For one thing they commit very specific meanings and can be readily recognised without accompanying co-text. As part of this specificity they can enact moves in exchange structure on their own – e.g. the statements and requests noted above, alongside greetings and leave-takings (hand waving), calls (beckoning gestures), agreement (nodding head), disagreement (shaking head), challenges (upright palm facing forward for ‘stop’) and so on. For another they are much more easily called to consciousness, as the first thing that comes to mind when someone mentions gesture. And in this regard they are often commented on as culturally specific (e.g. the difference between an Anglo supine hand beckoning gesture and its Filipino prone hand equivalent). In both respects emblems contrast with common-sense dismissals of the paralanguage (introduced in sections “Sonovergent paralanguage" and "Gesture converging with meaning (semovergent paralanguage)”) as idiosyncratic (although none of us has any trouble successfully interpreting another speaker’s sonovergent and semovergent systems). From the perspective of the sign language of the deaf, emblems most strongly resemble signs; they are expression form gestures explicitly encoding meaning. Similarly, from the perspective of character based writing systems (such as those of Chinese), emblems most strongly resemble characters (but gestured rather than scribed).

This indicates that emblems are better treated as part of language than as a dimension of paralanguage.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, here the authors outline their argument for classifying what Kendon terms 'emblems' as language rather than semovergent paralanguage (Cléirigh's epilinguistic body language).

[1] Incidentally, here the authors exemplify the use the word one as a constituent of a conjunctive Adjunct; see the preceding post on the vlogger gesturing the meaning 'one'.

[2] To be clear, in SFL theory, unknown to the authors, the conventionalisation of the meaning of specific gestures in a community corresponds to the move of the sign (content/expression pair) from the instance pole to the system pole of the cline of instantiation.  However, since this can occur in the development of semiotic systems in general — e.g. protolanguage, emoji, pictorial signage — it does not support the authors' argument that emblems are part of language.

[3] To be clear, gestures don't "commit" meanings, they realise them, since realisation is the relation between expression and content.  'Commitment', on the other hand, in Martin's own terms, is concerned with  instantiation, the relation between potential and instance, though, as previously explained here, the notion derives from Martin's misunderstanding of systemic delicacy.

[4] To be clear, here the authors have switched attention from tone groups to exchange structures in an attempt to fudge their argument.  In their own terms, these moves would constitute examples of interpersonal semovergent paralanguage, since the meaning of these gestures "resonates" or "converges" with the meanings of Martin's interpersonal discourse semantic system of NEGOTIATION.  Accordingly, this does not support the authors' argument that emblems are part of language.

[5] The authors' "argument" here is that because these gestures are regarded as prototypical gestures, they are therefore part of language.

[6] To be clear, on the one hand, some emblems are culturally-specific and some are not.  So culture specificity cannot be used as an argument about emblems as a type.  On the other hand, in any case, the culture-specificity of semiotic systems is not confined to language, as demonstrated, for example, by differences in the protolanguages of separated populations of the same species.

[7] To be clear, Halliday (1989: 30-1) distinguishes paralanguage from indexical features, the latter being those that are peculiar to the individual ("idiosyncratic").  So the authors' argument here is that  emblems are language because they are not indexical features.

[8] As this blog demonstrates, the authors do have trouble in interpreting both the meaning of the vlogger gestures and the type of body language involved.

[9] To be clear, the authors' argument here is that emblems are part of language because their expressions resemble the expressions of language (Sign and Chinese), and that, in the case of one of these, at least, the expressions "explicitly encode" meaning.

On the one hand, if this is true, it applies to all languages, not just Sign and Chinese.  On the other hand, the reason it is not true is that the expressions of Sign and Chinese, encode the wording that encodes meaning, whereas the expressions of emblems only encode meaning.  That is, Sign and Chinese, being languages, are tri-stratal, whereas emblems, not being language, are bi-stratal.  Once again, the authors' argument does not support their claim that emblems are part of language.

[10] As the above clarifications demonstrate, not one of the arguments offered by the authors supports their hypothesis that emblems are part of language.

Martin's Notion Of Commitment

Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 12-3):

In terms of commitment (i.e. the amount of meaning specified across semiotic modes; Martin 2010, Painter et al. 2013), the dermatologist and steroid are committed in the language but not the paralanguage; but the needle is more delicately committed in the paralanguage as a tiny pointed entity and then as a syringe. 

And the paralinguistic commitment of the bump in fact takes place two tone groups after it is committed verbally.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Martin's notion of 'commitment' is invalidated by the fact that it is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the system network, namely: that a speaker can choose the degree of delicacy to be instantiated during logogenesis.  As Martin (2011: 255-6) explains:

Instantiation also opens up theoretical and descriptive space for considering commitment (Martin 2008, 2010), which refers to the amount of meaning instantiated as the text unfolds.  This depends on the number of optional systems taken up and the degree of delicacy pursued in those that are, so that the more systems entered, and the more options chosen, the greater the semantic weight of a text (Hood 2008).

To be clear, a system network is not a type of flowchart, such that instantiation involves a movement through more and more delicate systems.  A system network is a network of relations.  In the case of lexicogrammar, the system specifies how all the features are related to each other, such that the instantiation of each lexical item in a text is the instantiation of all the features that specify it, from the most general all the way to the most delicate.

In short, Martin misconstrues what the linguist can do — decide on the degree of delicacy "pursued" in analysing a text — as what a speaker can do; but see also [3] below.

[2] Translating into SFL theory, the claim here is that the meanings 'dermatologist' and 'steroid' are instantiated in the language but not in paralanguage.  However, this is manifestly untrue.  As previously explained, the body of the speaker herself represented the dermatologist in two figures ('taking the needle' and 'injecting the steroid').

The instantiation of the meaning 'steroid' is more subtle.  Because, as Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 156) point out, a Process requires a Medium for its actualisation, the gesture representing the 'injecting' Process implicates a Medium, and so the meaning 'fluid' is at least implicated in the gesture, even if the meaning 'steroid' is not precisely specified.  (Try gesturing the meaning 'steroid'.)

To be clear, the authors' false claim derives from two procedural errors:

• assuming that handshape is the only bodily expression of ideational meaning here, and
• analysing at the level of element ("entity") instead of figure (while claiming the latter).

[3] As explained in [1], Martin's notion of "more delicate commitment" is nonsensical, based as it is on his misunderstanding of what system networks represent.

However, here it can also be seen that Martin confuses 'delicacy' as a scale of decreasing generality in system networks with 'delicacy' as a scale of decreasing generality in construing experience as meaning, as in 'needle' vs 'tiny pointed entity'.   It can also be seen that, even in these terms, the authors have the relation backwards, since 'tiny pointed entity' is a more general construal than 'needle', not more delicate, since, as a class, it includes a broader range of potential members.

[4] To be clear, the word 'syringe' is not instantiated in the data.  It appears only in the authors' gloss of the body language accompanying the wording and injected this like steroid.

[5] As explained in the previous post, the reason why this gesture is made with the final figure, and not the second, is that it realises the nucleus of the final figure, it all bubbled up, rather than the meaning of the word bump in the second figure.  The authors' confusion again arises from analysing isolated elements instead of their functions in figures.