The Argument That Paralanguage Is An Expression System Of Language

Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 26-7, 28):

But what about the stem -language which para- is prefixed to? The drift of consensus in gesture studies, as reviewed and promoted by Fricke (Fricke 2013) appears to be towards treating aspects of what we have been calling paralanguage here as part of language (in fact as part of grammar in Fricke’s work). From the perspective of SFL this argues for a re-interpretation of the taxonomy in Fig. 44 above as Table 6 below, with paralanguage positioned not alongside language but as part of its expression form.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, consensus is not argument, and to present it as argument is the logical fallacy known as Argumentum ad populum.

[2] To be clear, from the perspective of SFL, Fricke (2013) provides no argument with regard to theorising in SFL, because she does not proceed from the same theoretical assumptions as SFL.  That is, Fricke operates with a different conception of grammar, and a different conception what constitutes inclusion in a grammar, as the following quote (op. cit.: 734) makes clear:

[3] To be clear, the claim that paralanguage is an alternative to phonology, graphology and the expression systems of Sign languages is easily falsified by the fact that the following clause can be realised by genuinely linguistic expression systems, but not by Martin's semovergent paralanguage:

It is a miracle that curiosity survives formal education.

To be clear, in SFL, to be part of language, a semiotic system has to be systematically related to the grammar (Halliday 1985/9: 30).  This is why Cléirigh's linguistic body language ("sonovergent paralanguage") is called linguistic — because its gestures realise the same grammatical features as prosodic phonology, differing only in the parts of the body used to express them.

Epilinguistic body language ("semovergent paralanguage"), on the other hand, is not systematically related to the grammar, and like all semiotic systems other than language, is bi-stratal, not tri-stratal, which is why, unlike genuinely linguistic expression systems, it cannot realise the Einstein quote above.

∞

It is instructive to consider the overall argument of this paper:

• Firstly, Cléirigh's types of body language were rebranded as types of Martin's paralanguage, and then misunderstood and misapplied.
• Second, gestures realising numbers (claimed to be examples Kendon's emblems) were claimed to be expressions of language, not paralanguage.
• Finally, all paralanguage was claimed to be expressions of language (because people using other theories agree that it is).

To be clear, the reasons why the authors have interpreted their paralanguage as expressions of language are because

• linguistic body language ("sonovergent paralanguage") is language, and 
• the authors have confused intersemiotic relations ('convergence') with intrasemiotic stratification (realisation) and 
• have set out with the narrow intention to relate the expressions of epilinguistic body language ("semovergent paralanguage") to Martin's discourse semantic systems (his rebrandings of Halliday's speech function and cohesion).

The Argument That All Body Language Is Paralanguage

Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 26):

Compared to other modalities of communication, paralanguage has a distinctive relation to language in that it is coordinated with prosodic phonology. This is obviously true, by definition, for sonovergent paralanguage. But semovergent paralanguage is also coordinated with TONALITY, TONICITY RHYTHM and TONE, since gestures, facial expression, bodily stance and sounds unfold in measures of time converging with units of rhythm and intonation. Even brief episodes of mime follow this principle, filling in for ‘missing’ tonic segments or tone groups as a whole. Alongside this expression form of temporal dependency, paralanguage is dependent on the content form of language because of its inherent generality. Semovergent paralanguage typically commits meaning far less specifically than spoken language can; instantiations are by and large interpretable with respect to what is said. With respect to these two dependencies, the prefix para- (understood as ‘beside’) is appropriate.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously noted, the authors have not demonstrated this to be the case; they have merely presented the language accompanying gestures with markers of tone group boundaries in order to fudge their argument.  This is the logical fallacy known as begging the question (petitio principii).

[2] Here the authors claim that the use of mime in the absence of language demonstrates that mime is timed with units of rhythm and intonation.  By the same logic, it could be argued that mime is timed with the units of grammar or semantics that are also absent.

[3] Here the authors interpret the fact that epilinguistic body language (semovergent paralanguage) can occur with or without prosodic phonology as body language being dependent on prosodic phonology.

[4] Here the authors claim that epilinguistic body language (semovergent paralanguage) is dependent on the content form of language.  Apparently unknown to the authors, the content form of language refers to the rank units of the grammar: clause, phrase/group, word and morpheme.  On the one hand, the authors have not demonstrated any relations between epilinguistic body language and grammatical forms, and on the other hand, epilinguistic body language is bi-stratal: content / expression only — it has no grammatical stratum.

[5] Here the authors confuse descriptive delicacy — which Martin's 'commitment' confuses with systemic delicacy — with stratification.  Because epilinguistic body language, like all epilanguage, is only bi-stratal, it lacks the grammatical resources for realising meaning.  That is, its (linguistic) meaning can only be realised directly in expression systems, and this greatly reduces its semogenic potential in comparison to language.

[6] To be clear, the authors argue that body language is 'para-' on the basis that it is 'hypo-' (dependent); cf. paratactic vs hypotactic.  Moreover, neither of the stated dependencies survives close scrutiny, as [4] and [5] above demonstrate.  That is to say, the authors' argument does not support their claim that 'paralanguage' is an appropriate characterisation of these two body language systems.

The Meaning Of A Smile

Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 16, 17):

As outlined by Martin and White (2005) attitude may not be explicitly inscribed in language, but invoked by ideational choices a speaker expects a reaction to. We introduced an example of this in section “Sonovergent paralanguage” above, as the vlogger introduces the good news that her hair dye is back in stock at Target. Her smiling face makes explicit the affect that her language does not (Fig. 25).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misrepresents the metafunctions as separate modules, instead of complementary perspectives on meaning.  Choices that invoke attitude are interpersonal choices.  Moreover, a speaker can "expect a reaction" to ideational meaning in the absence of attitude.

[2] Here again the authors deploy the logical fallacy of 'begging the question' (petitio principi), since they assume the point their argument needs to establish, namely that the speaker's smile realises an assessment: the goodness of the 'news that her hair dye is back in stock at Target' (the authors' interpretation, not the speaker's words).

To be clear, the speaker's smile coincides only with the word Target, on which the tonic falls, marking it as the focus of New information.  So the timing of the smile is an instance of linguistic body language (Martin's sonovergent body language), and functions textually.

This also means that, if an assessment is being realised by the smile, it is solely an assessment of Target.  However, no assessment is being made here, the smile simply realises the speaker's positive emotion, as will be argued below.

To be clear, a smile is a physiological process that manifests a state of consciousness: a token of a senser's sensing, to adapt Halliday & Matthiessen's (1999: 210) phrase.  On Cléirigh's model, such behaviours are the raw material from which protolanguage develops. For example, in rainbow lorikeets, semiotic expressions of anger function socio-semiotically as expressions of the regulatory microfunction ('I want you-&-me'), in Halliday's model of protolanguage.

On Cléirigh's model, the speaker's smile is thus interpreted as an instance of the personal microfunction of protolinguistic body language, realising a positive emotion.  By the same token, the speaker's eye gaze is interpreted as an instance of the interactional microfunction of protolinguistic body language, signifying engagement with the viewer.

		meaning	kinetic expression
action	regulatory	I want, refuse, threaten	ø eg raised fist, glower
	instrumental	give me, I invite you	ø eg extended hand
reflection	interactional	togetherness, bonding	ø eg mutual eye gaze
	personal	emotions	ø eg smiling face

(adapted from Matthiessen 2007: 5)

(Note that emoticons (emojis) are thus epilinguistic (pictorial) reconstruals of protolinguistic body language.)

So, contrary to the author's claims, the smile does not realise an attitudinal assessment (AFFECT), and constitutes an instance of protolinguistic body language, not epilinguistic body language ('semovergent paralanguage').

[3] As argued above, this is not true.  Moreover, if it were true, it would be an instance of 'semovergent paralanguage' "resonating" with what is not actually said.