Martin & Zappavigna's Model Of Paralanguage

Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 28):

Our model of paralanguage might also prove of interest as a contribution to the growing field of interactional linguists (Ochs et al. 1996; Fox et al. 2013; Couper-Kuhlen and Selting 2001, 2018). These linguists see language structure as an emergent phenomenon which can only be understood in relation to the use of language in dialogue, and they draw heavily on Conversation Analysis (CA) in their research. This brings paralanguage and other modalities of communication into the picture as far as our understanding of language is concerned (cf. Heath and Luff 2013). SFL’s perspectives on multimodality creates an opportunity for linguistics to make a stronger contribution to this transdisciplinary exercise (Martin forthcoming).

Blogger Comments:

The authors end their paper by leaving the reader with the confirmation that Cléirigh's model of body language is henceforth their model of paralanguage.

The Model Of Intermodal Convergence

Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 27-8):

As we stressed at the beginning of the paper building models of intermodality is facilitated if the descriptions of distinct modalities are informed by the same theoretical principles; and this is important for applications. Work in educational linguistics, for example Hood (2011) and Hao and Hood (in press), regularly has to deal with the interaction of language, paralanguage and imaging on Power Point slides. And for forensic linguistics, for example Martin and Zappavigna (2013) and Martin and Zappavigna, 2018, Zappavigna and Martin (2018), language and paralanguage interact with the semiotics of the location of the legal proceedings (which are very different for courtrooms and Youth Justice Conferences). The model of intermodal convergence (ideational concurrence, interpersonal resonance and textual synchronicity) presented in Table 2 above is far easier to operationalise when each of the modalities involved is interpreted from the perspective of SFL.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the authors have concluded that paralanguage is an expression system of language.  That is, in their own terms, they have not provided a model of intermodality any more than proposing a phonological or graphological system of language would be a model of intermodality.

[2] To be clear, since the authors have concluded that paralanguage is an expression system of language, language and paralanguage do not interact, any more than language and phonology interact.

[3] To be clear, the model of intermodal convergence is one idea, redundantly given different names for each metafunction.  Moreover, the one idea is merely the superficial observation that different semiotic modes can make the same meaning.

More importantly, since the authors have concluded that paralanguage is an expression system of language, this model of intermodal convergence no longer applies, which, in turn, undermines the entire argument of the paper, given that the paper is predicated on the intermodal convergence of language and paralanguage (sonovergent vs semovergent).

Our Evolving Work Using Cléirigh's Model

Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 27):

Our evolving work on these dependencies can be tracked through Martin et al. (2010), Hood (2011), Martin (2011), Martin, Zappavigna, Dwyer, and Cléirigh (2013) Martin and Zappavigna, 2018, Zappavigna and Martin (2018), and Hao and Hood (in press). From the perspective of SFL the most pertinent work on relations between modalities to compare with these studies is Painter et al. 2013 (on language and image in children’s picture books). Beyond these initiatives, multimodal discourse analysis research is best guided by Bateman et al. (2017).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, since it misrepresents the authorship of this first publication featuring Cléirigh's model of body language.  The actual citation is:

• Zappavigna, M., C. Cléirigh, P. Dwyer & J. R. Martin. 2010. The coupling of gesture and phonology. In M. Bednarek, & J.R. Martin (eds.), New discourse on language: Functional perspectives on multimodality, identity and affiliation. London: Continuum. 219–236.

The function of misrepresenting Martin as the first author is to position Martin as the origination of "our evolving work". (The paper was primarily written by Zappavigna, using Cléirigh's model; Dwyer and Martin were the tenured academics who were granted funding for the project.)

[2] As the clarifying critiques on this blog demonstrate, "our evolving work" involves serious misunderstandings of Cléirigh's model of body language, with these misunderstandings now rebranded as Martin's model of paralanguage.

[3] To be clear, Bateman favourably reviewed Martin's first major publication, English Text (1992). However, in doing so, he neglected to check the provenance of "Martin's" ideas or to consider whether the work was consistent with SFL theory or even with itself; evidence here.  For some of Bateman's misunderstandings of SFL theory, see here.

On This Paper Clarifying The Theoretical And Descriptive Challenges Posed In Martin (2011)

Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 27):

This of course makes research into the relation between language and paralanguage an interesting case study as far as research into intermodality in general is concerned, possibly helping to clarify some of the theoretical and descriptive challenges posed in Martin 2011.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, if, as the authors argue, paralanguage is an alternative expression plane of language, then the relation between language and paralanguage is not 'intermodal', since language and paralanguage are just two perspectives on the same semiotic mode.

[2] To be clear, given the wealth of theoretical confusions in this paper that have been identified here, any clarifications of any theoretical and descriptive challenges are purely accidental.

On the other hand, ignoring the fact that Martin (2011) begins by misunderstanding Saussure's sign (pp243-5), and the relation between Saussure's sign and linguistics (p245), and ignoring all the other theoretical misunderstandings that follow, the questions posed by Martin can be listed here so that the reader can assess which of them this paper has helped to clarify.

p245:

Based on this reading of Saussure one could ask of any multimodal analyst:

1. Do you conceive of the sign as an entity that realises a meaning located outside itself (in the material world or in the mind or elsewhere) or alternatively as a meaning construing act?
2. Where and how, if at all, do you explicitly model valeur (i.e. the system of differences among signs)?

pp246-7:

Based on this reading of Hjelmslev and Halliday, one could ask of any multimodal analyst:

1. For a given semiotic system, how many strata are you proposing, and on which stratum is your description located?
2. Are your strata related by metaredundancy (as patterns of patterns)?
3. Are there distinct systems of valeur on each of the strata you propose?
4. Is there any ontogenetic or phylogenetic evidence suggesting that any stratified system you propose evolved from an unstratified or a less stratified system?

p247:

Based on this reading of Halliday, one could ask of any multimodal analyst:

1. For a given stratum, how many ranks are you proposing, and at which rank is your description located?
2. Are there distinct systems of valeur on each of the ranks you propose?
3. Are your distinct systems of valeur related by constituency (as parts to wholes)?

p248:

Based on this reading of Halliday, one could ask of any multimodal analyst:

1. For a given semiotic system, how many metafunctions are you proposing?
2. Are there topologically distinct systems of valeur for each of the metafunctions you propose?
3. By what criteria are systems of valeur seen as relatively independent or interdependent of one another?

p249:

Based on this reading of Halliday one could ask of any multimodal analyst:

1. For a given semiotic system, how many kinds of structural realisation are you proposing?
2. Are the different types of realisation associated with different types of meaning?
3. When analogising from metafunctions in language to your semiotic system did you take kinds of meaning or types of structure as point of departure?

p250:

Based on this reading of paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations in SFL one could ask of any multimodal analyst:

1. Are your descriptions formalised as system/structure cycles, explicitly showing the relation of systemic choices to structural consequences?
2. How many system/structure cycles are you proposing and how are they related to one another (by strata, rank, metafunction or some other theoretical parameter)?

p252:

Based on this reading of system and text in SFL one could ask of any multimodal analyst:

1. Is the complementarity of realisation and instantiation addressed your description?
2. If so, how are you distinguishing axial realisation (the defining interdependency of system and structure) from instantiation (the logogenetic unfolding of realisational resources as text)?
3. As far as the contextual specification of your system is concerned, what genres/registers/text types do you propose?

p254:

In relation to Matthiessen’s proposed cline of integration one could ask the multimodal analyst:

1. Do you manage intermodality by proposing a single system of valeur, on a higher stratum or not, realised axially or inter-stratally by two or more modalities (realisational integration); or do you propose a coupling process weaving together meanings from different modalities in a single text (instantial integration)?

p255:

Based on these intermodal integration and complementarity issues one can ask the multimodal analyst:

1. Are the relations you recognise as obtaining between modalities in an intermodal text the same as those you find between units of a text in a monomodal one?
2. Do you recognise different kinds of intermodal relations depending on the kind of meaning involved (ideational/interpersonal/textual)?

p256:

Based on this discussion of affordances and commitment one could ask the multimodal analyst:

1. How do you model the amount of meaning committed and thereby the complementary contribution of different semiotic systems in an intermodal text?
2. How does the semantic weight of a given system’s contribution reflect its affordances?

p260:

In light of this reading of Cléirigh, one could ask:

1. Is the semiotic system you are working on a denotative semiotic system, with its own content form and expression form?
2. If not, does it involve parametric resources of the kind outlined by van Leeuwen (i.e. multiple, simultaneous, graded, binary systems)?
3. If so, could it be usefully factored into protosemiotic, denotative semiotic and epilinguistic systems?

p262:

In light of these concerns with identity and affiliation, one could ask:

1. How do you describe the allocation of the semiotic resources you are focusing on to repertoires of users?
2. How do these repertoires engender communities of such users?
3. Is there a distinctive role for denotative semiotic, protosemiotic and episemiotic systems in this process?

pp263-4:

In light of these concerns with the limits of semiosis, one could ask:

1. On what basis do you distinguish between the semiosis you are considering and its biological and/or physical environment?
2. To what extent do you feel that interdisciplinary research involving neurobiologists and/or physicists is necessary to give a full account of the discourse you are considering?
3. Are you deliberately treating aspects of biological and physical materiality as if they were semiosis?

Paralanguage As Language Expression

Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 26-7, 28):

In this model, the content form of face-to-face linguistic communication can be realised as phonology (of spoken language) or sign (including the sign languages of deaf communities and the ‘emblems’ of hearing ones), plus in both cases sonovergent and semovergent paralanguage; and for many languages we have a graphological system used for written communication. This leaves us with the terminological challenge of how best to name the sound quality and gestural resources we have been calling paralanguage in this paper (since they wouldn’t be para- anymore); we will not attempt to improve on our usage here. 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, content form is form, not function, and only refers to grammatical forms (clause, phrase/group, word, morpheme).  In terms of SFL theory, the authors here confuse 'form' with 'plane' (the level of symbolic abstraction that includes the strata of semantics and lexicogrammar).

[2] Here the authors reduce the expression systems of Sign languages to mere emblems, such as the thumbs-up sign and the middle finger salute.  To be clear, Sign languages are languages, and so, tri-stratal, and their gestural systems realise the lexicogrammar, just as phonological systems realise the lexicogrammar of spoken languages.  Emblems, on the other hand, are bi-stratal signs, and so their expressions only realise meaning directly, without the considerable semogenic power that a stratum of grammatical systems provides.  This is why emblems are types of epilinguistic body language in Cléirigh's model.

[3] To be clear, the expression systems of sonovergent paralanguage (Cléirigh's linguistic body language) only realise the linguistic content that prosodic phonology realises.  That is, it cannot realise the linguistic content that articulatory phonology realises, such as lexical items.  So the authors are seriously mistaken in presenting sonovergent paralanguage as an alternative to the entire phonological system.

[4] As previously explained, the claim that semovergent paralanguage (Cléirigh's epilinguistic body language) is an alternative to phonology and graphology is falsified by any clause that cannot be realised in semovergent paralanguage, such as the Leo Szilard quote:

A scientist's aim in a discussion with his colleagues is not to persuade, but to clarify.

To be clear, no grammatical structures can be realised in epilinguistic expressions (semovergent paralanguage) because epilinguistic semiosis is bi-stratal, not tri-stratal, and so expressions realise meaning directly, without the considerable semogenic power that a stratum of grammatical systems provides.  It is the absence of a grammar that the parlour game Charades exploits.

[5] To be clear, the authors began the paper by rebranding Cléirigh's model of body language as their model of paralanguage, and now, having satisfied themselves that their paralanguage is not paralanguage, the authors shy away from rebranding it with a more appropriate term, such as body language.

The Argument That Paralanguage Is An Expression System Of Language

Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 26-7, 28):

But what about the stem -language which para- is prefixed to? The drift of consensus in gesture studies, as reviewed and promoted by Fricke (Fricke 2013) appears to be towards treating aspects of what we have been calling paralanguage here as part of language (in fact as part of grammar in Fricke’s work). From the perspective of SFL this argues for a re-interpretation of the taxonomy in Fig. 44 above as Table 6 below, with paralanguage positioned not alongside language but as part of its expression form.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, consensus is not argument, and to present it as argument is the logical fallacy known as Argumentum ad populum.

[2] To be clear, from the perspective of SFL, Fricke (2013) provides no argument with regard to theorising in SFL, because she does not proceed from the same theoretical assumptions as SFL.  That is, Fricke operates with a different conception of grammar, and a different conception what constitutes inclusion in a grammar, as the following quote (op. cit.: 734) makes clear:

[3] To be clear, the claim that paralanguage is an alternative to phonology, graphology and the expression systems of Sign languages is easily falsified by the fact that the following clause can be realised by genuinely linguistic expression systems, but not by Martin's semovergent paralanguage:

It is a miracle that curiosity survives formal education.

To be clear, in SFL, to be part of language, a semiotic system has to be systematically related to the grammar (Halliday 1985/9: 30).  This is why Cléirigh's linguistic body language ("sonovergent paralanguage") is called linguistic — because its gestures realise the same grammatical features as prosodic phonology, differing only in the parts of the body used to express them.

Epilinguistic body language ("semovergent paralanguage"), on the other hand, is not systematically related to the grammar, and like all semiotic systems other than language, is bi-stratal, not tri-stratal, which is why, unlike genuinely linguistic expression systems, it cannot realise the Einstein quote above.

∞

It is instructive to consider the overall argument of this paper:

• Firstly, Cléirigh's types of body language were rebranded as types of Martin's paralanguage, and then misunderstood and misapplied.
• Second, gestures realising numbers (claimed to be examples Kendon's emblems) were claimed to be expressions of language, not paralanguage.
• Finally, all paralanguage was claimed to be expressions of language (because people using other theories agree that it is).

To be clear, the reasons why the authors have interpreted their paralanguage as expressions of language are because

• linguistic body language ("sonovergent paralanguage") is language, and 
• the authors have confused intersemiotic relations ('convergence') with intrasemiotic stratification (realisation) and 
• have set out with the narrow intention to relate the expressions of epilinguistic body language ("semovergent paralanguage") to Martin's discourse semantic systems (his rebrandings of Halliday's speech function and cohesion).

The Argument That All Body Language Is Paralanguage

Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 26):

Compared to other modalities of communication, paralanguage has a distinctive relation to language in that it is coordinated with prosodic phonology. This is obviously true, by definition, for sonovergent paralanguage. But semovergent paralanguage is also coordinated with TONALITY, TONICITY RHYTHM and TONE, since gestures, facial expression, bodily stance and sounds unfold in measures of time converging with units of rhythm and intonation. Even brief episodes of mime follow this principle, filling in for ‘missing’ tonic segments or tone groups as a whole. Alongside this expression form of temporal dependency, paralanguage is dependent on the content form of language because of its inherent generality. Semovergent paralanguage typically commits meaning far less specifically than spoken language can; instantiations are by and large interpretable with respect to what is said. With respect to these two dependencies, the prefix para- (understood as ‘beside’) is appropriate.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously noted, the authors have not demonstrated this to be the case; they have merely presented the language accompanying gestures with markers of tone group boundaries in order to fudge their argument.  This is the logical fallacy known as begging the question (petitio principii).

[2] Here the authors claim that the use of mime in the absence of language demonstrates that mime is timed with units of rhythm and intonation.  By the same logic, it could be argued that mime is timed with the units of grammar or semantics that are also absent.

[3] Here the authors interpret the fact that epilinguistic body language (semovergent paralanguage) can occur with or without prosodic phonology as body language being dependent on prosodic phonology.

[4] Here the authors claim that epilinguistic body language (semovergent paralanguage) is dependent on the content form of language.  Apparently unknown to the authors, the content form of language refers to the rank units of the grammar: clause, phrase/group, word and morpheme.  On the one hand, the authors have not demonstrated any relations between epilinguistic body language and grammatical forms, and on the other hand, epilinguistic body language is bi-stratal: content / expression only — it has no grammatical stratum.

[5] Here the authors confuse descriptive delicacy — which Martin's 'commitment' confuses with systemic delicacy — with stratification.  Because epilinguistic body language, like all epilanguage, is only bi-stratal, it lacks the grammatical resources for realising meaning.  That is, its (linguistic) meaning can only be realised directly in expression systems, and this greatly reduces its semogenic potential in comparison to language.

[6] To be clear, the authors argue that body language is 'para-' on the basis that it is 'hypo-' (dependent); cf. paratactic vs hypotactic.  Moreover, neither of the stated dependencies survives close scrutiny, as [4] and [5] above demonstrate.  That is to say, the authors' argument does not support their claim that 'paralanguage' is an appropriate characterisation of these two body language systems.

What Semovergent Paralanguage Does

Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 25):

semovergent systems construe ideational meaning, enact interpersonal meaning and compose textual meaning convergently with the discourse semantics of language (and its realisation through lexi[c]ogrammar).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the claim here is that semovergent paralanguage (Cléirigh's epilinguistic body language) and discourse semantics construe the same ideational meaning; that is to say, that semovergent paralanguage instantiates the meanings of Martin's systems of IDEATION (experiential) and CONNEXION (logical).  There are two main problems with this claim:

Firstly, as previously demonstrated, the authors have not provided any evidence in support of the claim.  Secondly, Martin's two systems, IDEATION and CONNEXION, are his rebrandings of Halliday & Hasan's (1976) LEXICAL COHESION and COHESIVE CONJUNCTION, which are grammatical, not semantic, and textual in metafunction, not ideational.

[2] To be clear, the claim here is that semovergent paralanguage and discourse semantics enact the same interpersonal meaning; that is to say, that semovergent paralanguage instantiates the meanings of Martin's systems of NEGOTIATION and APPRAISAL.  There is one main problem with this claim:

As previously demonstrated, the authors have not provided any evidence in support of the claim.  That is, there are no instances of gestures realising NEGOTIATION features, and the gestures presented as realising APPRAISAL features are protolinguistic, not epilinguistic (semovergent).

[3] To be clear, the claim here is that semovergent paralanguage and discourse semantics compose the same textual meaning; that is to say, that semovergent paralanguage instantiates the meanings of Martin's systems of IDENTIFICATION and PERIODICITY. There are two main problems with this claim:

Firstly, as previously demonstrated, the authors have not provided any evidence in support of the claim.  That is to say, there are no instances of gestures realising the introduction of entities and their tracking through the discourse, and there are no instances of gestures realising macro-Themes, hyper-Themes, hyper-News or macro-News.

Secondly, Martin's system of IDENTIFICATION is his rebranding of Halliday & Hasan's (1976) COHESIVE REFERENCE, which is a grammatical system, not a semantic system; and Martin's system of PERIODICITY is writing pedagogy misunderstood as textual semantics.

[4] To be clear, Martin (1992) provides no specifications on how his discourse semantic systems are realised in lexicogrammatical systems.

What Sonovergent Paralanguage Does

Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 25):

Sonovergent systems enact interpersonal meaning in tune with and compose textual meaning in sync with the prosodic phonology of language;

Blogger Comments:

The claims here are that:

• sonovergent paralanguage and prosodic phonology are 'in tune' in enacting interpersonal meaning, and
• sonovergent paralanguage and prosodic phonology are 'in sync' in composing textual meaning.

The problems here are as follows.

Firstly, prosodic phonology doesn't enact interpersonal meaning, it realises the wording that realises interpersonal meaning. By the same token, prosodic phonology doesn't compose textual meaning, it realises the wording that realises textual meaning.

Secondly, Cléirigh's linguistic body language (sonovergent paralanguage) is a stratified semiotic system, not merely an expression plane system, like prosodic phonology.

Thirdly, (stratified) sonovergent paralanguage doesn't enact interpersonal meaning; it enacts intersubjective relations as interpersonal meaning.  By the same token, (stratified) sonovergent paralanguage doesn't compose textual meaning; it organises ideational and interpersonal meaning as textual meaning.

What The Authors Have Done In This Paper

Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 25):

In this paper we have outlined a model distinguishing behaviour from meaning (somasis vs semiosis), and within semiosis, language from paralanguage. Paralanguage itself was then divided into sonovergent and semovergent systems according to their convergence with either the expression plane or content plane of language.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the model the authors have outlined is (part of) Cléirigh's model, linguistic and epilinguistic body language, though misunderstood and rebranded as their own systems, sonovergent and semovergent paralanguage.

[2] As previously demonstrated here, having distinguished non-semiotic behaviour from semiosis, the authors then interpret non-semiotic behaviour as semiotic.

[3] As previously demonstrated, the paralanguage that the authors rebrand as 'sonovergent' is actually, in their own terms, 'semovergent', not 'sonovergent', because it instantiates the same meanings as language, but it diverges from language in the way it is expressed, gesturally rather than vocally.

On the other hand, the authors' approach to semovergent paralanguage has been merely an unsuccessful attempt to fit gestural data to Martin's discourse semantic systems, instead of using the gestural data to encode theory.  This will lead them to the erroneous conclusion (p26, 28) that paralanguage is an alternative expression form of language, alongside phonology, graphology and sign.

The Notion That Emblematic Gestures Are Linguistic Alternatives To Phonology And Graphology

Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 25, 27, 29):

The relationship we are emphasising between emblems and alternative expression form systems is outlined in Fig. 44, using the words zero, one, two, three, four and five as examples. These words can be alternatively expressed in English through segmental phonology (e.g. /tuw/), graphological characters (e.g. ‘2’) or hand gestures (index and middle finger vertical).

 

An outline of the place of emblems in our overall system in presented in Fig. 45. Rather than treating them as a dimension of paralanguage, we have moved them over to language proper, as an alternative manifestation of its expression form.

 

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, Kendon's 'emblems', which he describes as 'quotable gestures', are conventionalised signs, such as 'thumbs-up', the 'V-sign', or the 'middle-finger salute'.  As signs, they are meaning/expression pairs, not tri-stratal language.

The authors, however, here present hand-shapes representing numbers as emblems and, on that basis, argue that the gestures involved are an alternative form of linguistic expression, along with phonology and graphology. An easy way to falsify this claim is to try to use emblematic gestures alone to express the following verse from Kenneth Grahame's The Wind In The Willows:

The clever men at Oxford
Know all that there is to be knowed.
But they none of them know one half as much,
As intelligent Mr. Toad!

The Argument That 'Emblems' Are Part Of Language

Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 24-5):

These gestures differ from the semovergent ones illustrated thus far in critical ways (cf. McNeill 2012: 7–10). For one thing they commit very specific meanings and can be readily recognised without accompanying co-text. As part of this specificity they can enact moves in exchange structure on their own – e.g. the statements and requests noted above, alongside greetings and leave-takings (hand waving), calls (beckoning gestures), agreement (nodding head), disagreement (shaking head), challenges (upright palm facing forward for ‘stop’) and so on. For another they are much more easily called to consciousness, as the first thing that comes to mind when someone mentions gesture. And in this regard they are often commented on as culturally specific (e.g. the difference between an Anglo supine hand beckoning gesture and its Filipino prone hand equivalent). In both respects emblems contrast with common-sense dismissals of the paralanguage (introduced in sections “Sonovergent paralanguage" and "Gesture converging with meaning (semovergent paralanguage)”) as idiosyncratic (although none of us has any trouble successfully interpreting another speaker’s sonovergent and semovergent systems). From the perspective of the sign language of the deaf, emblems most strongly resemble signs; they are expression form gestures explicitly encoding meaning. Similarly, from the perspective of character based writing systems (such as those of Chinese), emblems most strongly resemble characters (but gestured rather than scribed).

This indicates that emblems are better treated as part of language than as a dimension of paralanguage.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, here the authors outline their argument for classifying what Kendon terms 'emblems' as language rather than semovergent paralanguage (Cléirigh's epilinguistic body language).

[1] Incidentally, here the authors exemplify the use the word one as a constituent of a conjunctive Adjunct; see the preceding post on the vlogger gesturing the meaning 'one'.

[2] To be clear, in SFL theory, unknown to the authors, the conventionalisation of the meaning of specific gestures in a community corresponds to the move of the sign (content/expression pair) from the instance pole to the system pole of the cline of instantiation.  However, since this can occur in the development of semiotic systems in general — e.g. protolanguage, emoji, pictorial signage — it does not support the authors' argument that emblems are part of language.

[3] To be clear, gestures don't "commit" meanings, they realise them, since realisation is the relation between expression and content.  'Commitment', on the other hand, in Martin's own terms, is concerned with  instantiation, the relation between potential and instance, though, as previously explained here, the notion derives from Martin's misunderstanding of systemic delicacy.

[4] To be clear, here the authors have switched attention from tone groups to exchange structures in an attempt to fudge their argument.  In their own terms, these moves would constitute examples of interpersonal semovergent paralanguage, since the meaning of these gestures "resonates" or "converges" with the meanings of Martin's interpersonal discourse semantic system of NEGOTIATION.  Accordingly, this does not support the authors' argument that emblems are part of language.

[5] The authors' "argument" here is that because these gestures are regarded as prototypical gestures, they are therefore part of language.

[6] To be clear, on the one hand, some emblems are culturally-specific and some are not.  So culture specificity cannot be used as an argument about emblems as a type.  On the other hand, in any case, the culture-specificity of semiotic systems is not confined to language, as demonstrated, for example, by differences in the protolanguages of separated populations of the same species.

[7] To be clear, Halliday (1989: 30-1) distinguishes paralanguage from indexical features, the latter being those that are peculiar to the individual ("idiosyncratic").  So the authors' argument here is that  emblems are language because they are not indexical features.

[8] As this blog demonstrates, the authors do have trouble in interpreting both the meaning of the vlogger gestures and the type of body language involved.

[9] To be clear, the authors' argument here is that emblems are part of language because their expressions resemble the expressions of language (Sign and Chinese), and that, in the case of one of these, at least, the expressions "explicitly encode" meaning.

On the one hand, if this is true, it applies to all languages, not just Sign and Chinese.  On the other hand, the reason it is not true is that the expressions of Sign and Chinese, encode the wording that encodes meaning, whereas the expressions of emblems only encode meaning.  That is, Sign and Chinese, being languages, are tri-stratal, whereas emblems, not being language, are bi-stratal.  Once again, the authors' argument does not support their claim that emblems are part of language.

[10] As the above clarifications demonstrate, not one of the arguments offered by the authors supports their hypothesis that emblems are part of language.

Emblems

Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 23-4):

Emblems

It remains to introduce our treatment of what Kendon (Kendon 2004) refers to as emblems, drawing on Ekman and Friesen (1969). Included here are gestures such as thumbs up or thumbs down (as praise or censure), index finger touching lips (for ‘quiet please’), hand cupped over ear (for ‘I can’t hear’), middle finger vertical (for ‘get fucked’) and so on. Our vlogger uses one of these gestures to introduce the first of her  explanations as to why her hair is darker than usual – raising her index finger as an emblem for the numeral ‘1’ (Fig. 43). 

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, in terms of SFL theory, the word one here functions like firstly, as a conjunctive Adjunct, realising a textually cohesive temporal conjunctive relation internal to the discourse.  On this basis, the index finger gesture, on Cléirigh's original model, is an instance of textual epilinguistic body language, an expression realising the same meaning as the word.

On Martin's (1992) model, cohesive conjunction is misunderstood as a logical discourse semantic system, now rebranded as CONNEXION.  On this basis, the authors here missed an opportunity to present an instance of logical semovergent paralanguage.  (It will later be seen that the authors regard emblems — what Kendon glosses as 'quotable gestures' — as expressions of language, rather than stratified paralanguage).

Mime As Paralanguage

Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 22-6):

In terms of the TONALITY of this sequence, there are two miming segments where tone groups might have been. For each, the vlogger mimes the paralanguage of her parking spot assailant. In the first slot she mimes his interpersonal attitude paralanguage, as discussed in section “Evaluation (interpersonal semovergent paralanguage)” above (Fig. 39).

 

In the second she mimes his ideational motion paralanguage as she twice gestures  leaving (the second time including a textual pointing gesture) (Figs. 40 and 41). 

The third time his motion gesture is mimed in fact concurs with language (Fig. 42). 

As we can see, the two miming segments are heavily co-textualised by language that makes explicit what is going on. The orientation to the narrative introduces the recurrent problem of someone following the vlogger in a parking lot and waiting for her to leave. The miming segments are themselves introduced with the incomplete tone group // he was like... //, with a missing tonic segment. The vlogger then mimes the expected information, before making it linguistically explicit in a tone group converging with the third iteration of the gesture.

Setting aside pantomime (the ‘art of silence’ Marcel Marceau referred to it), we can predict that co-textualisation of this kind is a generalisable pattern as far as semovergent paralanguage in the absence of language is concerned. What the moment of mime does not provide as far as language is concerned, the immediately preceding and following co-text does provide. So the convergent nature of semovergent paralanguage is clear.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, and motivated by the authors' desire to match data to theory — their claim that the tone group provides an essential unit of analysis for work on paralanguage — rather than to use data to encode theory, and theory to decode data.  To be clear, there are two miming segments where language might have been.  That is, the authors could just as easily have said there are two miming segments where clauses might have been, but this would not have matched their hypothesis.

[2] To be clear, the authors have previously (p21) defined mime as semiosis that does not accompany language:

In terms of our model mime is semovergent paralanguage that does not accompany language, an apparent contradiction in terms.

Nevertheless, here they present mime as semiosis that does accompany language.

[3] To be clear, the vlogger mimes the body language of her non-speaking "parking spot assailant".  In doing so, on Cléirigh's original model, she deploys epilinguistic body language ("semovergent paralanguage") to mime the protolinguistic body language of the frustrated motorist.  This is analogous to deploying pictorial epilanguage to represent protolanguage.  That is, contrary to the authors' claim, the body language of the motorist is neither paralanguage nor semovergent.

[4] To be clear, on Cléirigh's original model, the vlogger, through her arm gestures, deploys epilinguistic body language ("semovergent paralanguage") in miming the epilinguistic body language of the frustrated motorist. And simultaneously, through her facial expressions, she again deploys epilinguistic body language ("semovergent paralanguage") in miming the protolinguistic body language of the frustrated motorist.

[5] To be clear, unknown to the authors, this instance of language presents the meaning of the body language that immediately follows as the focus of New information.

[6] "Oh no it isn't!"  It was mime that Marcel Marceau referred to as the "art of silence", not pantomime. (Ordinarily, contrary to Kendon's use of the term, 'pantomime' refers to a type of musical comedy staged for family entertainment, especially around Christmas / New Year.)

[7] To be clear, here the authors claim that the "co-textualisation" of mime by language is what happens in the absence of language.

[8] Here the authors argue that the meanings not provided by mime "converge" with the meanings provided by language.  That is, the absence of meaning "converges" with meaning.

The Notion That Semovergence Implies Sonovergence

Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 20-1):

It is probably safe to say that whenever semovergent paralanguage is deployed, it will be coordinated with TONALITY, TONICITY and RHYTHM; this is tantamount to arguing that semovergence implies sonovergence. Sonovergent paralanguage on the other hand can be deployed without semovergence, through gestures in tune with or in sync with prosodic phonology (but no more).

An important exception to these principles is what is commonly referred to as mime. In terms of our model mime is semovergent paralanguage that does not accompany language, an apparent contradiction in terms.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the authors have provided no evidence in support of this bare assertion, as the posts on semovergent paralanguage on this blog demonstrate.  This is merely a reassertion of their earlier claim (p3):

We will in fact suggest that SFL’s tone group, analysed for rhythm and tone, provides an essential unit of analysis for work on paralanguage as far as questions of synchronicity across modalities are concerned.

[2] As previously explained, "sonovergent" paralanguage (Cléirigh's linguistic body language) is the direct opposite of "sonovergent" because the expression plane is where it differs from language.  The reason Cléirigh called it linguistic body language is because it realises the same content as prosodic phonology.

[3] Here the authors present Cléirigh's theorising as an observation made in terms of "their" model. Cf. Cléirigh's original definition of epilinguistic body language ("semovergent" paralanguage):

These are body language systems which, like pictorial systems, are made possible by the transition into language, but which are not systematically related to the lexicogrammar of language. When used in the absence of spoken language, this type of body language is called mime, and it is mimetic in this sense.

Plagiarism is the "wrongful appropriation" and "stealing and publication" of another author's "language, thoughts, ideas, or expressions" and the representation of them as one's own original work.

Multiple Dimensions Of Paralanguage Converging On The Same Tone Group

Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 20, 16):

Although presented as a simple taxonomy, all five subtypes of paralanguage can combine with one another in support of a single tone group (Fig. 38). 

Several examples of multiple dimensions of paralanguage converging on the same tone group were in fact presented above (for example, the combination of motion towards the future and pointing deixis in Example (19) of section “representation (ideational semovergent paralanguage)”). 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is Cléirigh's original model misleadingly presented as if it is a claim of the authors.

[2] As previous posts have demonstrated, this is not true of epilinguistic body language ("semovergent paralanguage"), which can be instantiated with or without language.  The authors have tried to mislead the reader, in this regard, by simply presenting all the text accompanying body language with tone group boundaries (//).

[3] For the misunderstandings and misrepresentations involved in the authors' analysis of this instance, see the two previous posts:

• Gestural Motion "Supporting" Direction In Space Or Time
• Introducing And Tracking Entities Through Finger Pointing

Taxonomy Of Sonovergent And Semovergent Paralanguage

Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 20, 24):

Multidimensionality (multiplying meaning)

The sonovergent and semovergent paralinguistic systems discussed thus far are outlined in Fig. 38 (including cross-references to Cléirigh’s original terminology).

Blogger Comments:

This is potentially misleading.  To be clear, this taxonomy simply represents Cléirigh's original model with:

1. body language rebranded as paralanguage,
2. linguistic (body language) rebranded as sonovergent (paralanguage),
3. epilinguistic (body language) rebranded as semovergent (paralanguage), and
4. protolinguistic (body language) omitted altogether.

However, as demonstrated in previous posts, the authors seriously misunderstand and misapply the model they are rebranding here as their own.

The Semovergent Paralanguage Of PERIODICITY

Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 19-20, 22-3):

As noted in sections “Sonovergent paralanguage and Information flow (textual semovergent paralanguage)” above however the vlogger does end the episode with a contrasting high then lowered pitch (Fig. 35). The higher pitch penultimate tone group begins rhythmically speaking with a handclap foot and then a foot comprising the ‘filler’ / um /.

This is followed by the low pitch tone group; the vlogger is winding down. Following this there is a suspension of both language and paralanguage as her the vlogger’s eyes shut and her head slumps forward (Fig. 36).

The preceding episode to the one we are using to explore sonovergence here ends in a similar way (lowered pitch, with eyes shut, head down) (Fig. 37). So shutting down language and paralanguage and handing over to somasis is clearly a strategy for punctuating longer waves of discourse. It is at these points that the vlogger cuts from one filmic segment to the next (as she thinks of something more to say).

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously explained here, in this instance, the authors mistook a (misanalysed) sequence of tones (language) as voice quality (paralanguage).  On Cléirigh's original model, any gestures consistent with the tone choices are instances of linguistic body language ("sonovergent" paralanguage), not epilinguistic body language ("semovergent" paralanguage), the concern of the present discussion.

[2] Here again, as above, the authors mistake a tone choice for paralanguage, and mistake the "sonovergent" gestures that are "in tune" with the pitch movement as "semovergent".

[3] The unarguable claim here is that ending discourse ('shutting down language and paralanguage and handing over to somasis') is one way ('strategy') of ending discourse ('punctuating longer waves of discourse').

∞

More to the point, the authors are here claiming to present paralinguistic examples of "longer waves of discourse".  In Martin & Rose (2007: 187-218), these are modelled in terms of:

• macro-Theme (introductory paragraph),
• hyper-Theme (topic sentence),
• hyper-New (paragraph summary), and
• macro-New (text summary).

To be clear, the authors have not identified any of the above in the text, and have not identified any semovergent paralanguage "in sync" with them.  Instead, the authors have merely mistaken intonation as paralanguage, and interpreted the unmarked tone for declaratives, tone 1 (and accompanying gestures) as "punctuating" a longer (unnamed) wave of discourse, while ignoring all the other instances of tone 1 (and accompanying gestures) at "non-punctuating" points in the discourse.

Again, the authors have tried to fit the data to their theory, instead of using theory to account for data.

The Claim That Units Of Speech Rhythm Realise Elements Of Writing Pedagogy

Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 19-20, 22-3):

As far as longer wave lengths of information flow are concerned,²³ our vlogger is seated and so whole body movement from one location to another is not a factor (as it would be for example for a lecturer roaming to and fro across a stage; cf. Hood 2011).

²³ van Leeuwen (1985, 1992) and Martinec (2002) argue that SFL’s phonological hierarchy can be pushed up several wave lengths beyond the tone group and their work suggests that higher level rhythm would converge with higher level periodicity in Martin's framework.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, the claim here is that proposed higher level phonological units "converge" with Martin's discourse semantic functions of macro-Theme, hyper-Theme, hyper-New and macro-New.  There are several obvious theoretical inconsistencies here.

The over-arching inconsistency is that the authors are proposing that patterns of speech rhythm correspond to pedagogical suggestions on how to write.  This is because Martin's four discourse semantic functions are actually rebrandings of introductory paragraph, topic sentence, paragraph summary and text summary, as previously explained.

A second inconsistency is that speech rhythm can only identify potential New information, and bears no systematic relation to thematicity.

A third inconsistency is that the use of gesture to realise New information is linguistic body language ("sonovergent" paralanguage), not epilinguistic body language ("semovergent" paralanguage).

A fourth inconsistency is the matching of structural units (wavelengths beyond the tone group) with elements of structure (Themes and News).

A fifth inconsistency, in the authors' own terms, is the use of their term for a relation between the same stratum of different semiotic systems, converge, for an interstratal relation within language.

Introducing And Tracking Entities Through Finger Pointing

Martin & Zappavigna (2019: 19, 21-2):

As far as pointing deixis is concerned we can return to the examples contrasting past and future in sections “Sonovergent paralanguage" and "Representation (ideational semovergent paralanguage)” above. Alongside motioning to the past the vlogger’s hand points there. And alongside motioning to the future both the vlogger’s index fingers point there (Figs. 33 and 34).

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the authors' claim (ibid.) is that:

From a textual perspective we need to take into account how spoken language introduces entities and keeps track of them once there (IDENTIFICATION) …

Clearly, because 'past' and 'future' are temporal locations, they are not entities, and pointing gestures do not introduce them as entities, nor keep track of them through the discourse.  This is another instance of the authors misrepresenting the data to fit their theory.

Note also that the unit of IDENTIFICATION in Martin (1992) and Martin & Rose (2007) is participant, not entity.

[2] Once again the authors present a tone group that is not analysed for tone or for foot boundaries, and wrongly analysed for tonicity (the tonic falls on next, not time).